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I.

INTRODUCTION

Near the end of the latest edition of my Medical Technology
casebook, I note the following puzzle:
Imagine that, after the implantation of a left ventricular
assist device (LVAD) for a failing heart, an ambulatory but
miserable patient asks a physician to deactivate it—would
† Professor of Law, University of Florida. I would like to thank those who
attended my paper presentation as part of the Grand Rounds in Cardiology series
at UF’s Health Sciences Center. This project provided the occasion for my
inaugural foray into end-of-life issues. My title alludes to a classic song from the
disco era, subsequently popularized by Gloria Estefan among others (and narrowly
beating out Sting’s “Be Still My Beating Heart” for my purpose).
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that fall within the constitutional right to request the
removal of ventilators or other forms of artificial (though
external) life-support equipment, or is it more akin to
requesting physician-assisted suicide (after all, a heart
transplant patient who fares poorly and regrets his choice
presumably would have no right to ask a surgeon simply to
remove the new organ or perhaps try to “deactivate” it by
1
applying a strong electrical current)?
Pacemakers and implantable cardioverter-defibrillators (ICDs)
pose similar questions, and medical ethicists have given this
2
conundrum a fair amount of attention, but the legal academic
literature seemingly has had nothing to say about it. In light of
likely future increases in the utilization of cardiac-assist devices and
continued technological advances, the problem will not
3
conveniently go away. My article offers a sustained analysis of this
intriguing question, and it also provides an opportunity to consider
broader issues about the legality of physician aid in dying from a
distinctive angle that none of the participants in that debate has
explored.

1. LARS NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 1148 (3d ed. 2012)
(adding that pacemakers and implantable cardioverter-defibrillators may pose
equally “tricky bioethical questions”).
2. See infra Part III. A pair of front-page Washington Post articles on the
subject included useful summaries of the ethical debate. See Rob Stein, Devices Can
Interfere with Peaceful Death: Implants Repeatedly Shock Hearts of Patients Who Cannot Be
Saved, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2006, at A1 (“The problem is an example of the
consequences of medical technologies proliferating before the ethical,
psychological and logistic issues they raise have been resolved.”); Rob Stein, Heart
Pump Creates Life-Death Ethical Dilemmas, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2008, at A1 (“Most
doctors and bioethicists equate [LVADs] to ventilators, feeding tubes and other
forms of life support that patients or their families have the right to
discontinue . . . , [though] some say that the devices raise unique issues.”); see also
Gina Kolata, Extending Life, Defibrillators Can Prolong Misery, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25,
2002, at A1 (“[ICDs] can fundamentally change the end stages of heart disease,
giving years of life to people who would otherwise die. Some experts are asking
whether the devices are going to create a new generation of patients who die slow
and painful deaths.”); Barry Meier, Lifesaving Devices Can Cause Havoc at Life’s End,
N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2010, at B1.
3. See Eugene B. Wu, The Ethics of Implantable Devices, 33 J. MED. ETHICS 532,
532 (2007) (“[D]evelopment of a clear ethics for [the] ICD is critical as the
massive technological advances in implantable heart failure devices will soon
produce an epidemic of patients with implanted devices and end-of-life diseases.”).
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II. HOSPITALS  ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY: ASSISTED LIVING MEETS THE
ENERGIZER BUNNY
Cardiologists have an ever-expanding range of procedures and
4
medical devices to use with their patients.
For instance,
angioplasty using balloon catheters allows physicians to open
partially blocked arteries instead of resorting to far riskier coronary
artery bypass surgery. The development of stents allowed for the
insertion of tiny metal scaffolds to help keep these blood vessels
open, and the advent of drug-eluting stents counteracted the risk of
5
clot formation.
Interventional cardiology has become big
business, with hospitals opening special “cath labs” to handle the
6
increasing volume of patients. Heart valve replacement surgery

4. See Earl S. Ford et al., Explaining the Decrease in U.S. Deaths from Coronary
Disease, 1980–2000, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2388, 2390–91 tbl.1, 2396–97 (2007);
Keith A.A. Fox et al., Decline in Rates of Death and Heart Failure in Acute Coronary
Syndromes, 1999–2006, 297 JAMA 1892, 1898–99 (2007); Mark A. Hlatky, EvidenceBased Use of Cardiac Procedures and Devices, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2126, 2127 (2004);
Lawrence K. Altman, Cheney File Traces Heart Care Milestones, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24,
2012, at D1.
5. See Sally Squires, The Selling of the Stent: Costly Drug-Eluting Stents Are Quickly
Gaining Market Share—but Research on Their Effectiveness Lags, WASH. POST, Sept. 16,
2003, at F1; see also Neal I. Muni & Thomas P. Gross, Problems with Drug-Eluting
Coronary Stents—The FDA Perspective, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1593 (2004) (discussing
some of the regulatory issues presented by the introduction of these devices).
6. See DAVID S. JONES, BROKEN HEARTS: THE TANGLED HISTORY OF CARDIAC
CARE 13 (2013) (“Together these procedures [bypass and angioplasty] form a
$100 billion industry in the United States alone.”); Reed Abelson & Julie Creswell,
A Hospital Chain’s Inquiry Cited Unneeded Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2012, at A1
(“Cardiology is a lucrative business for [Hospital Corporation of America], and
the profits from testing and performing heart surgeries played a critical role in the
company’s bottom line in recent years. Some of HCA’s busiest Florida hospitals
perform thousands of stent procedures each year.”); id. (“HCA has more than 100
catheterization labs across the country and the one at Lawnwood was a financial
juggernaut. It accounted for 35 percent of the hospital’s net profits, according to
financial documents.”); Jane E. Brody, More Isn’t Always Better in Coronary Care, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 6, 2009, at D7 (reporting that some physicians have become “vocal
about the overuse of ‘interventional cardiology,’ a specialty involving invasive
coronary treatments that have become lucrative for the hospitals and doctors who
perform them”); Sarah Kliff, HCA Probe Shines Light on Heart Care: Many Cardiac
Procedures Are Unnecessary, Risky and Costly, Studies Show, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2012,
at A13 (“Inappropriate cardiac interventions occur so regularly that a term for it
has been coined in the medical literature: ‘Oculostenotic reflex’ . . . .”); see also
James C. Robinson, Hospital Market Concentration, Pricing, and Profitability in
Orthopedic Surgery and Interventional Cardiology, 17 AM. J. MANAGED CARE e241, e243–
44 (2011) (“These procedures were highly profitable, with contribution margins
per patient ranging from . . . 56% for angioplasty, [to] 44% for CRM [cardiac
rhythm management] . . . .”).
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7

has become more common as well.
Cardiologists also have made growing use of various implants
designed to maintain regular beating of the heart, a category
sometimes denominated as “cardiovascular implantable electronic
8
devices” (CIEDs). Cardiologists who specialize in cardiac rhythm
9
management (CRM) using CIEDs are called electrophysiologists.
10
Pacemakers go back more than half a century, and they
combine two components: a pulse generator that produces
rhythmic electrical signals and electrodes (commonly referred to as
11
“leads”) that deliver those signals to the patient’s heart. Patients
with an irregular or abnormally slow heart rate, which can
predispose them to heart attack or at least cause inadequate
oxygenation of tissues throughout the body, often can benefit from

7. See Matthew Perrone, FDA Weighs Heart Valve’s Risks in Considering Broader
Use, WASH. POST, June 13, 2012, at A15 (reporting that approximately 50,000
Americans undergo aortic valve replacement surgery each year).
8. See Bruce L. Wilkoff et al., HRS/EHRA Expert Consensus on the Monitoring of
Cardiovascular Implantable Electronic Devices (CIEDs): Description of Techniques,
Indications, Personnel, Frequency and Ethical Considerations, 5 HEART RHYTHM 907, 908
(2008). See generally KIRK JEFFREY, MACHINES IN OUR HEARTS: THE CARDIAC
PACEMAKER, THE IMPLANTABLE DEFIBRILLATOR, AND AMERICAN HEALTH CARE (2001).
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) classification regulations include them
alongside other “cardiovascular prosthetic devices.” See Cardiovascular Devices;
General Provisions, 45 Fed. Reg. 7904, 7906, 7939–47 (Feb. 5, 1980) (codified as
amended at 21 C.F.R. pt. 870(D) (2012)). Equipment that delivers electrical
pulses through paddles applied to the skin rather than implanted leads gets
lumped together with other “cardiovascular therapeutic devices.” See id. at 7906,
7967–70 (codified as amended at 21 C.F.R. pt. 870(F)).
9. See Lou-Anne M. Beauregard, Ethics in Electrophysiology: A Complaint from
Palliative Care, 33 PACING & CLINICAL ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 226 (2010); Gerald V.
Naccarelli et al., Training in Specialized Electrophysiology, Cardiac Pacing, and
Arrhythmia Management, 51 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 374 (2008); see also Jeptha P.
Curtis et al., Association of Physician Certification and Outcomes Among Patients
Receiving an Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillator, 301 JAMA 1661, 1669 (2009)
(“Nonelectrophysiologists implant 29% of ICDs . . . .”); William G. Stevenson et al.,
Clinical Assessment and Management of Patients with Implanted Cardioverter-Defibrillators
Presenting to Nonelectrophysiologists, 110 CIRCULATION 3866, 3867 (2004).
10. See Kirk Jeffrey & Victor Parsonnet, Cardiac Pacing, 1960–1985: A Quarter
Century of Medical and Industrial Innovation, 97 CIRCULATION 1978 (1998). Some
authors use the acronym “PM” when referring to a pacemaker.
11. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 870.3610, .3680 (2012); see also Classification of
Permanent and Temporary Pacemaker Electrodes, 44 Fed. Reg. 13,379, 13,379–80
(proposed Mar. 9, 1979) (discussing the different types of leads and the range of
problems experienced with their use). Other components include a polymeric
mesh bag to hold an implanted pulse generator; external devices to program the
pulse generator, analyze its function, and recharge the battery; and miscellaneous
accessories. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 870.3620–.3730.
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12

a pacemaker. By inserting an extra lead, electrophysiologists can
13
pace both the right ventricle and right atrium, and they also can
use pacemakers for “cardiac resynchronization therapy” (CRT) to
14
coordinate beating between the left and right ventricles. Battery
15
External
life varies but generally averages close to a decade.
pacemakers exist as well, used for instance on a stopgap basis
16
during routine surgery to guard against heart attack.
Implantable cardioverter-defibrillators (ICDs) first came into
use during the early 1980s and are basically pulse generators with
17
different programming than traditional pacemakers. Not unlike
12. See Fred M. Kusumoto & Nora Goldschlager, Medical Progress: Cardiac
Pacing, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 89, 89–92 (1996) (summarizing the various
indications for pacemaker use).
13. See Jeffrey & Parsonnet, supra note 10, at 1985–86 (discussing “dualchamber” pacemakers); Kusumoto & Goldschlager, supra note 12, at 89 (noting
the popularity of dual-chamber pacing); id. at 93–97 (explaining the different
modes available with programmable pacemakers); see also Stéphane Rinfret et al.,
Cost-Effectiveness of Dual-Chamber Pacing Compared with Ventricular Pacing for Sinus
Node Dysfunction, 111 CIRCULATION 165, 170–71 (2005).
14. See Joshua M. Hare, Editorial, Cardiac-Resynchronization Therapy for Heart
Failure, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1902, 1903–04 (2002) (discussing “biventricular”
pacemakers); see also John G.F. Cleland et al., The Effect of Cardiac Resynchronization
on Morbidity and Mortality in Heart Failure, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1539, 1546 (2005);
Graham Nichol et al., Cost-Effectiveness of Cardiac Resynchronization Therapy in Patients
with Symptomatic Heart Failure, 141 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 343, 343–44 (2004).
15. See Michael Kindermann et al., Longevity of Dual Chamber Pacemakers: Device
and Patient Related Determinants, 24 PACING & CLINICAL ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 810, 815
(2001); Janet Moore, Longer-Life Pacemaker Approved, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), May
4, 2007, at 1D (adding that St. Jude’s Zephyr can last 14 years); cf. Janek Senaratne
et al., Pacemaker Longevity: Are We Getting What We Are Promised?, 29 PACING &
CLINICAL ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 1044, 1050–54 (2006) (finding that batteries last
more than a year less on average than projected by manufacturers).
16. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 870.3600, .5550.
17. See Michael Glikson & Paul A Friedman, The Implantable Cardioverter
Defibrillator, 357 LANCET 1107 (2001); Zachary Goldberger & Rachel Lampert,
Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillators: Expanding Indications and Technologies, 295
JAMA 809, 813–14 (2006); see also Mark A. Hlatky et al., Evidence-Based Medicine and
Policy: The Case of the Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillator, 24 HEALTH AFF. 42, 48
(2005) (“The ICD field has evolved very quickly, and devices on the market today
have much greater capabilities than those of only two or three years ago.”). As
described in the FDA’s classification regulation, implanted pulse generators
“correct both intermittent and continuous cardiac rhythm disorders. This device
[class] may include triggered, inhibited, and asynchronous modes . . . .” 21 C.F.R.
§ 870.3610(a); see also id. § 870.3680(b)(1) (providing that electrodes may be used
to “transmit a pacing electrical stimulus from the pulse generator to the heart
and/or to transmit the electrical signal of the heart to the pulse generator”).
Nonetheless, because ICDs had not been marketed prior to enactment of the
Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.), manufacturers must secure full

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

5

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 7

1234

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:4

the old paddle sets used to resuscitate patients in hospitals or at the
18
scene of an accident, ICDs deliver an electrical jolt when they
19
detect cardiac arrhythmias (fibrillation). In addition, ICDs may
function as more traditional pacemakers and facilitate CRT as
20
More familiar than external pacemakers, automated
well.
21
external defibrillators (AEDs) also have become commonplace.
LVADs represent the newest class of cardiac-assist devices,
though they provide mechanical circulatory support rather than
22
23
electrical assistance. Sometimes called partial artificial hearts,
premarket approval of these devices while most pacemakers still only need to go
through an abbreviated premarket notification process to demonstrate
“substantial equivalence” to a previously sold device. See Barnaby J. Feder, Medical
Device Ruling Redraws Lines on Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2008, at C2. The FDA
recently amended its classification regulations to call for the filing of either a
premarket approval application or a notice of completion of a product
development protocol for certain pacemaker components. See Effective Date of
Requirement for Premarket Approval for a Pacemaker Programmer, 77 Fed. Reg.
37,570 (June 22, 2012) (amending 21 C.F.R. § 870.3700); Effective Date of
Requirement for Premarket Approval for an Implantable Pacemaker Pulse
Generator, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,573 (June 22, 2012) (amending 21 C.F.R. § 870.3610).
18. See 21 C.F.R. § 870.5300.
19. See John P. DiMarco, Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillators, 349 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1836, 1837–38 (2003); Fred M. Kusumoto & Nora Goldschlager, Device
Therapy for Cardiac Arrhythmias, 287 JAMA 1848, 1850–51 (2002); Robert J.
Myerburg, Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillators After Myocardial Infarction, 359 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2245, 2245 (2008); see also Stevenson et al., supra note 9, at 3867
(“Battery longevity is typically 4 to 7 years (dependent on use) . . . .”).
20. See Michael R. Bristow et al., Cardiac-Resynchronization Therapy with or
Without an Implantable Defibrillator in Advanced Chronic Heart Failure, 350 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 2140, 2148–49 (2004); DiMarco, supra note 19, at 1838, 1842; Alan Kadish,
Editorial, Prophylactic Defibrillator Implantation—Toward an Evidence-Based Approach,
352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 285, 286 (2005).
21. See Lawrence Altman, Defibrillators for the Public Aid Survival, Study Says,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2003, at A16 (noting that “the devices have become standard
equipment in many airports, malls, convention centers and health clubs”); see also
21 C.F.R. § 870.5310 (FDA classification regulation). See generally Kevin M.
Rodkey, Comment, Medical Technology Meets the Maryland General Assembly: A Case
Study in Handling Advances in Automated External Defibrillator Technology, 12 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 81 (2009).
22. See 21 C.F.R. § 870.3545; Classification of Ventricular Bypass (Assist)
Devices, 44 Fed. Reg. 13,370, 13,371 (proposed Mar. 9, 1979) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pt. 870) (noting that LVADs remained investigational at the time); Muriel
R. Gillick, The Technological Imperative and the Battle for the Hearts of America, 50
PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 276 (2007) (recounting the history behind this device’s
development); Piera Morlacchi & Richard R. Nelson, How Medical Practice Evolves:
Learning to Treat Failing Hearts with an Implantable Device, 40 RES. POL’Y 511, 515–21
(2011) (same). Although less common, surgeons instead may implant right
ventricular assist devices (RVADs) or biventricular assist devices (BiVADs).
23. Fully implanted total artificial hearts (TAHs) still await final FDA
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they help to move blood from the left ventricle—one of the heart’s
four chambers—into the aorta, which then circulates oxygenated
blood throughout the body. Originally, these mechanical pumps
required bulky external power packs and tubing, and they only
were meant to serve as a temporary “bridge” while a patient with
24
congestive heart failure awaited an organ transplant. LVADs have
25
worked well enough to become “destination” treatments, and
newer versions utilize a turbine to promote continuous (rather
26
than pulsatile) blood flow through the heart.
Presently, these
implanted devices must remain tethered to external controllers
and power-packs, which patients may sling over their shoulders or
27
wear around their waists on belts.
approval. See David Jolly, An Artificial Heart Its Makers Say Could Be a Standard
Replacement, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2010, at B10 (reporting that the only FDAapproved total artificial heart, SynCardia’s update of the Jarvik-7, “has been
implanted in more than 800 patients as a bridge before transplant,” while
Abiomed’s fully implantable device enjoys limited distribution under the agency’s
“humanitarian use” exemption); Rob Stein, Artificial Heart Gets FDA Panel Approval;
Device Is Interim Before Transplant, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2004, at A1 (noting that
SynCardia’s device “could be used only in a hospital and would require patients to
be tethered to a large console that powers and controls the heart”). Unlike
LVADs, TAH implantation necessitates the complete removal of the patient’s
heart. See Renée C. Fox & Judith P. Swazey, “He Knows That Machine Is His
Mortality”: Old and New Social and Cultural Patterns in the Clinical Trial of the AbioCor
Artificial Heart, 47 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 74, 81–82 (2004).
24. See Richard Saltus, Artificial Heart Pumps Are Making a Comeback, BOS.
GLOBE, Aug. 12, 1996, at C1; Ruth SoRelle, Spare Hearts: Bridges for the Heart, HOUS.
CHRON., Oct. 13, 1997, at A1; Sally Squires, Putting Heart Failure on Hold: New
Devices Keep Blood Flowing While Patients Wait for Transplants, WASH. POST, July 12,
1994, at F9.
25. See Sally Brush et al., End-of-Life Decision Making and Implementation in
Recipients of a Destination Left Ventricular Assist Device, 29 J. HEART & LUNG
TRANSPLANTATION 1337, 1337–38 (2010); James C. Fang, Editorial, Rise of the
Machines—Left Ventricular Assist Devices as Permanent Therapy for Advanced Heart
Failure, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2282, 2283 (2009); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Pump Extends
Lives, and Raises Questions, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2002, at F1. In some cases, an LVAD
allows a patient’s heart to recover sufficiently so that the device can be explanted.
26. See Farooq H. Sheikh & Stuart D. Russell, HeartMate® II Continuous-Flow
Left Ventricular Assist System, 8 EXPERT REV. MED. DEVICES 11 (2011); Mark S.
Slaughter et al., Advanced Heart Failure Treated with Continuous-Flow Left Ventricular
Assist Device, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2241, 2242, 2244 fig.1, 2249–50 (2009); Daniel
Timms, A Review of Clinical Ventricular Assist Devices, 33 MED. ENGINEERING & PHYSICS
1041 (2011) (comparing different models).
27. See Yukihiko Nosé et al., Editorial, The Need to Change Our Objective for
Artificial Heart Development: From Totally Implantable Permanent Ventricular Assist
Devices to Wearable Therapeutic Ventricular Assist Devices, 34 ARTIFICIAL ORGANS 1069
(2010); Joseph G. Rogers et al., Continuous Flow Left Ventricular Assist Device Improves
Functional Capacity and Quality of Life of Advanced Heart Failure Patients, 55 J. AM. C.
CARDIOLOGY 1826, 1827 fig.1 (2010); see also Kiyo Fukamachi & Nicholas Smedira,
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As with angioplasty, hospitals and clinics have found CIEDs to
28
be a lucrative source of income. Some critics have complained
about the inappropriate overuse of such devices—for instance,
cardiologists have implanted ICDs in patients who do not really
need them or in patients who may need them but suffer from other
29
conditions that make these patients poor candidates for surgery.
Increasingly, recipients have shorter life expectancies than the
30
The expanding utilization of these
batteries in their devices.
Smaller, Safer, Totally Implantable LVADs: Fact or Fantasy?, ACC CURRENT J. REV., Aug.
2005, at 40, 42 (“Presently, no continuous-flow pump undergoing a clinical trial is
completely implantable, but all are designed for easy conversion of the nextgeneration model to total implantability.”); cf. Raja Mishra, Abiomed Poised to Tap
Wider Market as Artificial Heart Faces Crucial Tests, BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 2, 2003, at D1
(“Patients [with fully implanted TAHs] wear batteries in belt pack that transfers
energy to the heart via radio waves. No tubes or wires run in and out of
patients.”).
28. See Chunliu Zhan et al., Cardiac Device Implantation in the United States from
1997 Through 2004: A Population-based Analysis, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. (Supp. 1)
13, 16 (2008) (“[P]atient admissions for cardiac device procedures might be more
profitable than other hospital admissions.”); Barry Meier, Sales Tactics on Implants
Raise Doubts, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2011, at B1; see also Paul A. Heidenreich et al.,
Forecasting the Future of Cardiovascular Disease in the United States: A Policy Statement
from the American Heart Association, 123 CIRCULATION 933, 935 tbl.2 (2011)
(estimating over $60 billion in current annual expenditures on care of coronary
heart disease and heart failure).
29. See Sana M. Al-Khatib et al., Non-Evidence-Based ICD Implantations in the
United States, 305 JAMA 43, 47 (2011) (finding a rate of inappropriate use
exceeding twenty-two percent); Denise Grady, Many Defibrillators Called Unneeded,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2011, at A12. But see Douglas L. Packer et al., ICDs: Evidence,
Guidelines and Glitches, 8 HEART RHYTHM 800 (2011) (responding to the study by AlKhatib et al.).
30. See Anemona Hartocollis, Rise Seen in Medical Efforts to Improve Very Long
Lives, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2008, at A1 (highlighting the case of a 104-year-old
patient who had received an ICD combined with a biventricular pacemaker five
years earlier); see also Raymond Cutro et al., Device Therapy in Patients with Heart
Failure and Advanced Age: Too Much Too Late?, 155 INT’L J. CARDIOLOGY 52, 52
(2012) (“[O]ver 40% of all new ICD and CRT implants [in the United States] are
in patients over the age of 70, and 10–20% are in patients over 80 years of age.”);
Sharon R. Kaufman et al., Ironic Technology: Old Age and the Implantable Cardioverter
Defibrillator in US Health Care, 72 SOC. SCI. & MED. 6 (2011) (focusing on use in
octogenarians); Ure Mezu, Effectiveness of Implantable Defibrillators in Octogenarians
and Nonagenarians for Primary Prevention of Sudden Cardiac Death, 108 AM. J.
CARDIOLOGY 718, 721 (2011) (“Given the increased probability of death from
competing causes in elderly patients, patients older than a certain age cease to
extract a survival benefit from an ICD.”). Cardiac-assist devices occasionally get
used in much younger patients. See Janet Moore, Vital Companions: Because They’re
Not Just “Little Adults,” Children with Medical Devices Pose Unique Challenges, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Sept. 3, 2006, at 1D (describing a special camp for children with
heart disease, adding that “many are alive today because they were implanted with
pacemakers, defibrillators, valves and other devices”); Ron Winslow, Heart Beat: A
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devices in elderly patients has, of course, depended heavily on
31
coverage under Medicare.
III. MEDICAL ETHICISTS FRAME THE DEBATE
Ethical questions associated with requests to deactivate
implanted cardiac-assist devices have drawn sustained attention
32
As explained more fully below, the articles
from clinicians.
published to date generally defend the practice. The medical
literature also contains several surveys of various individuals’
attitudes about CIED deactivation that document different parties’
perspectives in order to help inform the ethical debate, including
33
34
the views of patients,
health care professionals,
and
New Heart Pump, Just for Kids, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2011, at D1.
31. See Mark B. McClellan & Sean R. Tunis, Medicare Coverage of ICDs, 352 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 222, 222 (2005) (summarizing the gradual expansion in coverage that
has occurred since 1986).
32. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Ballentine, Pacemaker and Defibrillator Deactivation in
Competent Hospice Patients: An Ethical Consideration, 22 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE
MED. 14 (2005); Lofty L. Basta, End-of-Life and Other Ethical Issues Related to
Pacemaker and Defibrillator Use in the Elderly, 15 AM. J. GERIATRIC CARDIOLOGY 114,
116 (2006); Juan Pablo Beca et al., Deactivating Cardiac Pacemakers and Implantable
Cardioverter Defibrillators in Terminally Ill Patients, 18 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE
ETHICS 236 (2009); Nathan E. Goldstein & Joanne Lynn, Trajectory of End-Stage
Heart Failure: The Influence of Technology and Implications for Policy Change, 49 PERSP.
BIOLOGY & MED. 10, 14–15 (2006); James N. Kirkpatrick & Antony Y. Kim, Ethical
Issues in Heart Failure: Overview of an Emerging Need, 49 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 1, 6
(2006); Hannah I. Lipman, Deactivation of Advanced Lifesaving Technologies, 16 AM. J.
GERIATRIC CARDIOLOGY 109, 110 (2007); see also James N. Kirkpatrick et al., Medical
Ethics and the Art of Cardiovascular Medicine, 376 LANCET 508, 509 (2010) (“Device
management at the end of life can be ethically complex.”).
33. See, e.g., Nathan E. Goldstein et al., “That’s Like an Act of Suicide”: Patients’
Attitudes Toward Deactivation of Implantable Defibrillators, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED.
(Supp. 1) 7, 11 (2008) (“[W]e found that patients were either unwilling or unable
to engage in conversations about deactivation.”); James N. Kirkpatrick et al.,
Deactivation of Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators in Terminal Illness and End of Life
Care, 109 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 91, 93–94 (2012); Daniel B. Kramer et al., Ethical and
Legal Views Regarding Deactivation of Cardiac Implantable Electrical Devices in Patients
with Hypertrophic Cardiomyopathy, 107 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 1071, 1074 (2011) (“Even
this highly-educated cohort expressed substantial uncertainty and confusion about
the legal status of CIED deactivation, and more than half could not identify
whether variables such as the presence of a terminal illness were required for a
device to be deactivated.”); Claire E. Raphael et al., Implantable CardioverterDefibrillator Recipient Attitudes Towards Device Deactivation: How Much Do Patients Want
to Know?, 34 PACING & CLINICAL ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 1628 (2011); Patricia H.
Strachan et al., Patients’ Perspectives on End-of-Life Issues and Implantable Cardioverter
Defibrillators, 27 J. PALLIATIVE CARE 6, 9–10 (2011).
34. See, e.g., Nathan E. Goldstein et al., “It’s Like Crossing a Bridge”: Complexities
Preventing Physicians from Discussing Deactivation of Implantable Defibrillators at the End
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35

representatives of device manufacturers.
A.

ICDs and Such

Timothy Quill, a general practitioner and professor of
medicine and psychiatry at the University of Rochester, became
one of the first persons to pen an article about this problem in a
medical journal. Dr. Quill, perhaps best known as the name
plaintiff in one of the physician-assisted suicide cases to reach the
36
U.S. Supreme Court, co-authored a defense of ICD deactivation in
37
1994. This brief article started by offering a first-of-its-kind case
study of a patient requesting that his ICD, which had fired
38
regularly, get turned off. The authors then simply assumed that
of Life, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. (Supp. 1) 2 (2008); Paul J. Hauptman et al.,
Physician Attitudes Toward End-Stage Heart Failure: A National Survey, 121 AM. J. MED.
127, 131 (2008) (“[D]iscussions with patients and families about potential device
deactivation are very uncommon across all physician specialties.”); Amy S. Kelley et
al., Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillator Deactivation at the End of Life: A Physician
Survey, 157 AM. HEART J. 702, 706–07 (2009); Daniel B. Kramer et al., “Just Because
We Can Doesn’t Mean We Should”: Views of Nurses on Deactivation of Pacemakers and
Implantable
Cardioverter-Defibrillators,
32
J.
INTERVENTIONAL
CARDIAC
ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 243, 248–49 (2011); id. at 250 (“Our study offers additional
evidence that health professionals view pacemakers and ICDs differently (from
each other and from other life-sustaining therapies).”); Laura J. Morrison et al.,
Managing Cardiac Devices Near the End of Life: A Survey of Hospice and Palliative Care
Providers, 27 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE MED. 545, 548–49 (2010).
35. See Paul S. Mueller et al., “I Felt Like the Angel of Death”: Role Conflicts and
Moral Distress Among Allied Professionals Employed by the US Cardiovascular Implantable
Electronic Device Industry, 32 J. INTERVENTIONAL CARDIAC ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 253,
257–60 (2011) (finding significant involvement of industry employees in CIED
deactivation requests).
36. See Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev’d sub nom. Quill v.
Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev’d, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Jane Gross, Quiet
Doctor Finds a Mission in Assisted Suicide Court Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1997, at B1; see
also infra notes 133–38 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s decision).
Dr. Quill had made headlines a few years earlier after publishing an account about
helping one of his patients commit suicide. See Timothy E. Quill, Death and
Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision Making, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 691 (1991);
Lawrence K. Altman, Jury Declines to Indict a Doctor Who Said He Aided in a Suicide,
N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1991, § 1, at 1. Jack Kevorkian, a retired Michigan pathologist,
drew far less positive press after he began assisting people who wanted to commit
suicide. See Lawrence K. Altman, More Physicians Broach Forbidden Subject of
Euthanasia, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1991, at C3; John Schwartz, A Polarizing Figure in
End-of-Life Debates, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2011, at A21.
37. See Timothy E. Quill et al., Discontinuing an Implantable Cardioverter
Defibrillator as a Life-Sustaining Treatment, 74 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 205 (1994).
38. See id. at 205; id. at 206 (“[W]e found no case reports in which an ICD was
turned off for a patient who explicitly wanted to die.”); see also TIMOTHY E. QUILL, A
MIDWIFE THROUGH THE DYING PROCESS: STORIES OF HEALING AND HARD CHOICES AT
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the case did not differ from requests for the withdrawal of other
39
life-sustaining treatments at the end of life, devoting the bulk of
their article to proposing a set of guidelines for handling all such
40
cases without mentioning any special features linked to ICDs.
Fourteen years later, Dr. Quill published an article that made a
passing reference to deactivating LVADs, but again with an almost
41
cavalier assumption of equivalence.
END OF LIFE 72–90 (1996) (elaborating on this case study). It did not take
long for other such case reports to appear in the literature. See, e.g., Lofty Basta &
Michael L. O’Neal, Ethical Issues in the Management of Geriatric Cardiac Patients: A
Terminal/Dying Patient Endures Repeated Shocks from an Automatic Implantable
Cardioverter Defibrillator Unit, 9 AM. J. GERIATRIC CARDIOLOGY 174, 175 (2000); Yuen
Cheng Looi, Letter, And It Can Go On and On and On . . . , 31 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM
MGMT. 1, 1–2 (2006) (focusing on some of the practical difficulties encountered in
deactivating an ICD); Vinod Nambisan & David Chao, Dying and Defibrillation: A
Shocking Experience, 18 PALLIATIVE MED. 482, 482–83 (2004) (same); Kenneth
Plunkitt et al., Ethical Issues in the Management of Geriatric Cardiac Patients: A Patient
Is Asking His Cardiologist to Deactivate an Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillator Device in
Order to Allow Him to Die, 7 AM. J. GERIATRIC CARDIOLOGY 43, 43–44 (1998).
39. See Quill et al., supra note 37, at 206 (“Discontinuation of other potentially
life-sustaining medical interventions such as mechanical ventilation, renal dialysis,
and artificial hydration and nutrition is widely reported and practiced.” (endnotes
omitted)); id. (“As illustrated in the case presented, life-sustaining medical
treatments can save and prolong meaningful life. They are also capable of
indefinitely prolonging a life filled with progressive suffering and loss, thereby
prolonging an agonizing death.”); see also id. at 205 (“A competent patient . . . has
the right to discontinue a treatment that has previously been initiated if it no
longer meets the patient’s goals.”). Subsequent commentators repeated this
mistake. See, e.g., Jeffrey T. Berger, The Ethics of Deactivating Implanted Cardioverter
Defibrillators, 142 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 631, 633 (2005); Plunkitt et al., supra note
38, at 43–44; Samuel F. Sears et al., Quality of Death: Implantable Cardioverter
Defibrillators and Proactive Care, 29 PACING & CLINICAL ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 637, 641
(2006); Debra Lynn-McHale Wiegand & Peggy G. Kalowes, Withdrawal of Cardiac
Medications and Devices, 18 AACN ADVANCED CRITICAL CARE 415, 416, 419 (2007).
40. See Quill et al., supra note 37, at 206 (urging physicians confronting such
cases to ensure that the patient’s request is rational and consistent, that the
patient’s prognosis is reasonably clear, that the patient understands his
alternatives, that depression has been excluded, that specific plans be made for
post-withdrawal palliative care, and that a second opinion be obtained).
41. See Timothy E. Quill, Physician-Assisted Death in the United States: Are the
Existing “Last Resorts” Enough?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.–Oct. 2008, at 17, 19
(“These [life-sustaining] technologies no longer just mean ventilators and feeding
tubes; they now include radical technologies such as ventricular-assist devices. But
while the array of medical choices faced by patients and families has grown more
complex, ethics and law remain clear that patients have a right both to forgo such
treatments and to stop them once started.”); see also id. at 18 (prefacing this as a
“widely accepted and relatively uncontroversial” option); Brad Stuart, Letter, On
Deactivating Cardiovascular Implanted Electronic Devices (CIEDs): Let Our People Go, 14
J. PALLIATIVE MED. 1089, 1090 (2011) (“[E]ven patients who are completely device
dependent, such as those on destination VAD therapy, should not be prohibited
THE
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The problem has gotten the most sustained attention from a
group at the Mayo Clinic led by Paul Mueller. Dr. Mueller and his
associates first published an article in 2003 detailing half a dozen
42
case studies involving requests to deactivate pacemakers or ICDs,
concluding—based in part on a citation to Dr. Quill’s 1994
article—that such cases do not differ from other instances involving
43
the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatments. They elaborated on
that conclusion somewhat by invoking causation and intent
arguments previously used to justify the withdrawal of other forms
of life-sustaining care at a patient’s request: “In PAS
[physician-assisted suicide] and euthanasia, a new intervention is
introduced (e.g., drug), the sole intent of which is the patient’s
death. In contrast, when a patient dies after an intervention is
refused or withdrawn, the underlying disease is the cause of
44
death.”

from discontinuing it, any more than they currently are from, say, discontinuing a
ventilator.”).
42. See Paul S. Mueller et al., Ethical Analysis of Withdrawal of Pacemaker or
Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillator Support at the End of Life, 78 MAYO CLINIC PROC.
959, 959–61 (2003) (only one of the six cases involved an ICD).
43. See id. at 962 & n.9; see also id. at 963 (“Patients have the right to refuse any
and all unwanted medical interventions or to request their withdrawal, including
pacemakers and ICDs.”). The authors conceded that new technologies might
challenge the settled understandings of physicians and ethicists. See id. at 962
(“[A]s medical interventions become less invasive and more effective at
prolonging life, . . . clinicians will continue to be challenged by ethical dilemmas
involving terminally ill patients who have been treated with new technologies.”).
They failed to consider, however, any peculiar features of CIEDs that might
distinguish them from other life-sustaining treatments.
44. Id. at 962; see also id. at 963 (“Unlike PAS or euthanasia, which cause
death via an externally implemented means, death after the refusal or withdrawal
of unwanted interventions is caused by the patient’s underlying disease.”). The
U.S. Supreme Court had relied on just these factors in previously drawing such a
line. See infra notes 138–46 and accompanying text (discussing and critiquing
these arguments); see also Lawrence O. Gostin, Deciding Life and Death in the
Courtroom: From Quinlan to Cruzan, Glucksberg, and Vacco—A Brief History and
Analysis of Constitutional Protection of the “Right to Die,” 278 JAMA 1523, 1527 (1997)
(explaining that the Court’s “reasons for differentiating between the two practices
fly in the face of a body of philosophic literature examining questions of causation
and intention in medicine”); Steven D. Smith, De-Moralized: Glucksberg in the
Malaise, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1571, 1575–79 (2008) (same). Even die-hard
opponents of PAS recognize that this distinction cannot rest on grounds of
causation and intent. See Yale Kamisar, The “Right to Die”: On Drawing (and Erasing)
Lines, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 481, 490–93, 519 n.163 (1996) (defending the distinction on
other grounds); see also Norman L. Cantor, On Kamisar, Killing, and the Future of
Physician-Assisted Death, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1793, 1801–04 (2004) (applauding
Professor Kamisar’s “intellectual honesty” in this regard).
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Five years later, Dr. Mueller and his associates revisited the
subject, reporting the results of a survey about the issue conducted
45
among specialists in electrophysiology.
Although finding
somewhat greater discomfort among respondents in deactivating
46
pacemakers as compared with ICDs, the authors emphasized that
more than half of those surveyed saw such cases as
indistinguishable from requests to withdraw other life-sustaining
treatments such as artificial nutrition and hydration, dialysis, and
47
ventilators, and they largely reiterated their prior arguments
48
defending the practice based on intent and causation.
A couple of years later, the Mayo team published another
survey, this time querying a somewhat broader range of medical
professionals plus adding legal professionals and patients to the
45. See Paul S. Mueller et al., Deactivating Implanted Cardiac Devices in Terminally
Ill Patients: Practices and Attitudes, 31 PACING & CLINICAL ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 560
(2008). Among other things, they “found that requests to deactivate pacemakers
and ICDs in terminally ill patients are common.” Id. at 566.
46. See id. at 567 (“The practices and attitudes associated with pacemaker
deactivation differ significantly from those associated with ICD deactivation.”); see
also id. at 563 (“11.3% of the respondents described pacemaker deactivation in
terminally ill patients as euthanasia, and 1.3% of the respondents described ICD
deactivation as euthanasia (P < 0.001). Similar numbers of respondents described
device deactivation as physician-assisted suicide . . . .”); id. at 564 (“Among the
respondents, 63.6% saw an ‘ethical or moral distinction between deactivating a
pacemaker and deactivating an ICD’ in terminally ill patients.”); Mueller et al.,
supra note 35, at 257–60 (documenting similar views among industry personnel).
47. See Mueller et al., supra note 45, at 566 (“A majority of respondents did
not distinguish between device deactivation and withholding or withdrawing other
life-sustaining treatments in terminally ill patients.”). Actually, in all but one of
these comparisons, fewer than sixty percent of respondents took that position, see
id. at 564, leaving a substantial minority thinking that CIEDs raise ethically
meaningful differences. For generally comparable findings in a survey of nonelectrophysiologists, see Daniel B. Kramer et al., Ethical and Legal Views of Physicians
Regarding Deactivation of Cardiac Implantable Electrical Devices: A Quantitative
Assessment, 7 HEART RHYTHM 1537, 1540 (2010) (“Notably, 25% to 49% of
physicians considered deactivation of PMs and ICDs to be morally distinct from
withdrawal of other life-sustaining therapies, and cessation of these devices was less
frequently supported in clinical scenarios involving stable ambulatory patients with
terminal illnesses.”); id. at 1541 (“Physicians characterized PM and ICD
deactivation as physician-assisted suicide substantially more frequently than
previously reported.”); Saadia Sherazi et al., Physicians’ Preferences and Attitudes
About End-of-Life Care in Patients with an Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillator, 83 MAYO
CLINIC PROC. 1139, 1140 (2008) (“Strikingly, nearly half of the physicians who were
not cardiologists or electrophysiologists were uncertain about the legality of
withdrawing ICD therapy in terminally ill patients.”).
48. See Mueller et al., supra note 45, at 566 (conceding, however, that, “if the
intent of the [CIED] deactivation is to cause death of the patient, then
deactivation could be characterized as euthanasia”).
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49

mix. Again they found the respondents more comfortable with
50
ICD as opposed to pacemaker deactivation. Perhaps because Dr.
Mueller relinquished lead-author status on this article, however,
their analysis of the underlying question showed some hints of
51
equivocation. First, they noted that all of the available case law
52
related to the withdrawal of “external” devices and treatments.
49. See Suraj Kapa et al., Perspectives on Withdrawing Pacemaker and Implantable
Cardioverter-Defibrillator Therapies at End of Life: Results of a Survey of Medical and Legal
Professionals and Patients, 85 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 981, 982 (2010); id. at 987
(“Although several studies have focused on the attitudes of medical professionals
regarding management of ICD therapy at the end of life, few have assessed
attitudes regarding PMs, only 2 have looked at patient attitudes, and none have
examined the attitudes of legal professionals.”). Their idea of taking the pulse of
the legal profession was to survey the faculty at five leading law schools! See id. at
982 (adding that they also had mailed questionnaires to judges but all declined to
participate); id. at 989 (recognizing several possible limitations with this aspect of
the survey, and conceding that “it is unclear if the sum of their individual opinions
may be extrapolated to a more general legal opinion”).
50. See id. at 989 (finding “almost one-third of medical professionals
perceiv[e] withdrawal of a PM as physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia and only
1% believ[e] the same about an ICD”); id. (“[G]reater than one-third of
respondents overall thought that withdrawing PM therapy in the PM-dependent
patient was akin to physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia.”); cf. id. (“Legal
professionals, however, tended to see few differences between withdrawal of ICDs
and PMs, perhaps reflecting a different vantage point on the withdrawal of lifesustaining therapies. In fact, legal professionals most commonly thought that
there was a lack of clarity in whether turning off an ICD or PM was legal.”).
51. See id. at 987; id. at 989 (“Although existing case law does not specifically
focus on ICDs or PMs, extension of case law to these therapies generally supports
their withdrawal when the patient requests it.”). In contrast, Dr. Mueller stuck to
his original guns in a commentary piece that he solo-authored that same year. See
Paul S. Mueller, Editorial, Clinicians’ Views Regarding Deactivation of Cardiovascular
Implantable Electronic Devices in Seriously Ill Patients, 7 HEART RHYTHM 1543, 1544
(2010) (emphasizing that “no treatment, including a CIED therapy, has unique
moral status, i.e., must be continued once started”).
52. See Kapa et al., supra note 49, at 981 (“[D]ecisions on many externally
provided life-sustaining therapies, including feeding tubes, mechanical ventilation,
cardiopulmonary resuscitation in the event of cardiac arrest, and the
administration of . . . external pacing, have typically favored the right of the
patient or the surrogate decision maker to refuse and withdraw therapy.”). They
noted other differences as well:
[M]ost legal cases have focused on withdrawal of life-sustaining therapies
that are often more proximate to the end-of-life event (eg, intubation
and mechanical ventilation, feeding tubes, and intravenous hydration) or
visibly invasive (eg, hemodialysis). Cardiac device therapies, such as ICDs
and PMs, are unique in that they dwell within the patient’s body and,
except in the case of an ICD shock, are often imperceptible to the
patient.
Id. at 987; see also id. at 981 (“[T]o our knowledge, no legal cases have focused on
the legality of [implanted cardiac] device withdrawal.”).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss4/7

14

Noah: Turn the Beat Around: Deactivating Implanted Cardiac-assist Devic

2013]

DEACTIVATING CARDIAC DEVICES

1243

Second, the authors conceded that certain patients cannot survive
53
without their CIEDs. After repeating their previously made points
54
about causation and intent, the authors focused on the “artificial”
nature of CIEDs to buttress their sense that physicians who
deactivated these devices upon a patient’s request had acted
55
ethically.
B.

Looking Beyond Simplistic Parallels

Daniel Sulmasy offered a more nuanced treatment of ICD
56
deactivation. At the outset, he suggested that the existing ethical
defenses may have too quickly dismissed as unfounded the
discomfort registered by clinicians and patients when queried
about the matter, noting a “discrepancy between ethical analysis
57
and clinical reality.”
Indeed, Dr. Sulmasy wondered whether
“there may be more going on here from a moral point of view than
58
the ethics of the 1970s can handle,” echoing a theme sounded by
53. See id. at 988 (discussing pacemaker-dependent patients).
54. See id. at 987; see also id. at 988 (“[E]stablished case law holds that patients
have the right to refuse or request the withdrawal of any treatment and has
repeatedly held that no single treatment holds unique moral status, although no
single case has focused specifically on management of ICDs and PMs at the end of
life.”).
55. See id. at 988 (“[I]t is an artificial therapy that a patient can refuse or
request the withdrawal of, just as a patient can refuse or request the withdrawal of
mechanical ventilation.”). The authors used the term “artificial” five times on this
single page without explaining why this made all the difference. See id.
56. See Daniel P. Sulmasy, Within You/Without You: Biotechnology, Ontology, and
Ethics, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. (Supp. 1) 69 (2008).
57. Id. (“Several previously published ethical analyses . . . have declared such
misgivings to be misguided and have proceeded to analyze the discontinuation of
ICD treatment using standard bioethical categories such as patients’ rights, refusal
of unwanted therapy, autonomy, futility, and non-maleficence.”); see also id.
(“[I]ssues long thought settled intellectually by ethicists, such as the difference
between withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatments, still present
lingering doubts for patients and practitioners.”); id. at 70 (“[W]hat seems
equivalent according to the logic of ethics continues to feel psychologically
different to both patients and practitioners.”). For instance, a small study of
patient attitudes published alongside Sulmasy’s commentary had concluded that
“ICDs are fundamentally different from other interventions that patients might
receive at the end of life.” Goldstein et al., supra note 33, at 11 (“[P]atients appear
to develop a complex psychological relationship with their ICD in a way unlike
other interventions. The devices provide a sense of security (‘like an insurance
policy’ or like a trusted friend) and the very notion of removing them is ‘like an
act of suicide.’”); id. (“Participants seem to have developed a symbiotic
relationship with the device. If the ICD is seen as a friend, then it is difficult for a
patient to believe that the device could actually do them any harm.”).
58. Sulmasy, supra note 56, at 69 (“As technology progresses, ethics must keep
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his colleague Lynn Jansen a couple of years earlier. Jansen had
60
61
proposed that one look at a device’s location, duration of use,
62
and functional role, but she hastened to add that such a
framework would not invariably answer the core question of
whether a treatment had become so much a part of a patient that a

pace.”); id. at 69–70 (“As biotechnological progress marches forward, new
interventions are challenging our notions about the difference between killing
and allowing to die. . . . [D]o new technologies, such as ICDs, require that the line
between killing and allowing to die be redrawn?”); id. at 72 (“It is critically
important . . . that we begin thinking seriously and carefully about what makes an
intervention a part of the patient . . . . The rapid pace of technological progress
assures us that these sorts of questions will continue to surface in clinical
practice.”).
59. See Lynn A. Jansen, Hastening Death and the Boundaries of the Self, 20
BIOETHICS 105 (2006).
With the advent of newer and better life-sustaining devices, some of
which will be indwelling and some of which will consist of human tissue,
we can expect greater uncertainty over the boundaries of the self in the
future. To grapple with the moral issues raised by this uncertainty, we
will either need to revise our moral principles or learn to live with the
unsettling possibility that they provide no guidance in these cases.
Id. at 111; see also id. at 105 (“[I]n end-of-life contexts, when patients are receiving
‘artificial’ life-support, judgments about where the person or self begins and where
he or she ends can become controversial. This can give rise to considerable
uncertainty over whether a relevant moral principle applies or not.”).
60. See id. at 109 (“The fact that an object is under one’s skin does not settle
the matter of whether it is a part of one’s self, but it is relevant to such a
determination. . . . [W]e are inclined to view objects that are within our bodies as
part of us.”). Initially, however, she largely had dismissed this factor as a critical
line of demarcation. See id. at 106 (“Whether an artificial life-sustaining device is
internal or external to the body does not change the fact that it is an artificial lifesustaining device.”); id. at 108–09 (“[T]he self cannot be defined by spatial
boundaries. Our selves are not identical with all that exists under our skins. Some
indwelling devices or growths are not part of us.”).
61. See id. at 109–10 (“The amount of time an object has existed within one’s
body is relevant to determining whether it is a part of one’s self. . . . If the
pacemaker had been implanted only days or weeks before the illness, then the
case for considering it to be a part of the patient’s self would be considerably
weaker.”). It might make more sense to view this factor as a question about
relative permanence, no matter how much time may have elapsed in any
particular case.
62. See id. at 110. Jansen offered the following illustration to clarify what she
meant by the third factor:
If a child swallows a metal penny, and the penny stays inside him his
entire life, we would not be inclined to view the penny as part of this
person’s adult self. But if the metal object is . . . a mechanical heart valve
that functions to keep his heart pumping properly, then we will be much
more inclined to view it as part of the self.
Id.; see also id. at 107–08 (making a similar point about tumors).
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63

physician could not withdraw it.
Dr. Sulmasy considered—and
largely rejected—each of these factors in turn before offering his
own (though not altogether dissimilar) test.
Sulmasy started by elaborating on a purported distinction
between “regulative” therapies (namely, those that “coax the body
back toward its own homeostatic equilibrium,” such as ICDs) and
“constitutive” therapies (namely, those that “take over a function
that the body can no longer provide for itself,” such as
64
pacemakers).
Although conceding that discontinuation would
“raise more questions” in connection with constitutive rather than
65
regulative therapies, ultimately he concluded that it should make
66
no ethical difference.
Next, Sulmasy wondered about an internal/external
distinction: “Does the fact that many new medical technologies are
inside the body mean that they have thereby become part of the
person so that deactivating an ICD or a pacemaker becomes
morally equivalent to discontinuing the function of a natural heart
67
by injecting [potassium chloride]?” He recognized that, under
63. See id. at 110 (“Factors such as spatial location, temporal duration and
functional role, then, are relevant to the identification of the boundaries of the
self. . . . But these factors do not settle the matter in all cases.”). Indeed, Jansen
focused on pacemakers (rather than ICDs) and tentatively concluded (somewhat
surprisingly given her framework, especially after also critiquing the common
reliance on causation arguments) that it would not amount to active killing. See id.
at 106–07, 108, 110–11. A different set of authors who focused on ICDs offered an
intermediate position: such devices become sufficiently “integral” so that a
physician could not unilaterally deactivate them on grounds of futility, but they
are not so integral that a physician would have to decline a patient (or surrogate)
request for deactivation. See Ruth England et al., The Ethical and Legal Implications
of Deactivating an Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillator in a Patient with Terminal
Cancer, 33 J. MED. ETHICS 538, 539–40 (2007); see also infra note 170 (discussing
futility).
64. See Sulmasy, supra note 56, at 70; id. at 71 (“An ICD is regulative. It does
not supply the heart rhythm. Rather, it shocks an abnormal cardiac rhythm back
into normal sinus rhythm.”).
65. Id. at 70 (“Mimicking physiology, doing what the body no longer can do
for itself, seems closer to being ‘a part of the patient’ than does a therapy that
nudges the body into healing itself.”).
66. See id. (“[W]e still regularly accept the morality of discontinuing
constitutive therapies such as ventilatory support. The fact that a treatment is
constitutive does not seem to mark a moral difference between killing and
allowing to die.”). He also dismissed duration-of-use as morally irrelevant. See id.
(noting that a request to withdraw ventilator support actually may deserve more
serious consideration the longer that the patient has used it).
67. See id. Others have noted perceptual differences that result. See Goldstein
et al., supra note 34, at 5 (“Both hemodialysis and ventilator support also require
large machinery, which creates a physical reminder that advanced technologies
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conventional approaches, “deactivating an external pacemaker is
morally equivalent to deactivating an internal pacemaker, and
deactivating an external defibrillator is morally equivalent to
68
discontinuing an ICD.” Even though he conceded that a heart
transplant patient would have no right to demand withdrawal of
that treatment, Sulmasy rejected the internal/external divide on
69
the strength of little more than a straw man argument.
Having largely dismissed the factors emphasized by Professor
70
Jansen, Dr. Sulmasy instead tentatively suggested that only a
subset of what he had called “constitutive” therapies might become
sufficiently integral to a patient that their withdrawal would amount
to physician aid in dying: treatments that fully “replace” (as
71
opposed to simply “substitute” for) a diseased function.
are being used to sustain life. . . . Because the ICD is so small and innocuous, its
size does not create a daily interference with a patient’s quality of life . . . .”); see
also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 288 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“Highly invasive treatment may perpetuate human existence through
a merger of body and machine that some might reasonably regard as an insult to
life rather than as its continuation.”).
68. Sulmasy, supra note 56, at 70–71; see also id. at 71 (“But is this correct?
Does not having a device inside a patient make it a part of the patient, part of her
physiology, so that stopping its function is killing?”).
69. See id. at 71. Taking “internal” to mean “under the skin” (taking Jansen
too literally), he imagined a severe burn victim with a skin graft who demands
withdrawal of this “external” life-sustaining treatment. See id. (“Most plastic
surgeons would refuse to do this on the grounds that they would be mutilating, if
not killing, the patient, even if she were otherwise dying from some other
comorbid disease.”). Sulmasy contrasted this situation with the following one,
where he thought that physicians clearly should honor a request for withdrawal:
an implant delivering a hormonal treatment to the site of prostate cancer. See id.
Although more clearly internal, I fail to see how that qualifies as life-sustaining.
70. See id. (“[W]hereas Jansen’s insight is correct—that some treatments must
truly be considered within the ontological boundaries of the patient’s ‘self’—I do
not think the criteria she has suggested fully capture the distinction.”).
71. See id. (offering this admittedly imprecise distinction as a “preliminary
hypothesis,” and concluding that “the more an intervention can be understood as
a replacement therapy, the less it seems morally appropriate to withdraw it”); id. at
72 (“Whereas there is no absolute standard for judging whether something is a
replacement or a substitute, the more clearly a technology can be classified as a
replacement therapy, the greater the case for judging that its discontinuation
would constitute an immoral act of killing.”). Under his approach, “regulative”
therapies such as ICDs would never cross the line. See id. at 71 (“These
interventions are distinct from the organism and extrinsic to its function, whether
administered inside or outside the body.”); id. (“Regulatory therapies, no matter
how sophisticated, and whether located inside the body or not, can be thought
about just as one would think about withholding or withdrawing more standard
forms of therapy at the end of life.”); id. at 72 (“[D]eactivating an ICD can be
ethically distinguished from killing and considered a part of good palliative
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What I mean by a replacement therapy is a technological
intervention that participates in the organic unity of the
patient as an organism. . . . A replacement therapy is one
that has become part of the patient’s restored physiology.
The most important feature of a replacement therapy is
that it provides the function that has been pathologically
lost, more or less in the same manner in which the patient
72
was once able to provide this function when healthy.
As potentially relevant factors, Sulmasy mentioned responsiveness
to its surrounding environment, capacity for growth and self-repair,
freedom from external power sources and expert control,
immunologic compatibility, and physical integration into the
73
After having subjected Jansen’s factors to a pointed
body.
rebuttal, however, Sulmasy never provided any account for why one
or more of his factors should count in the ethical analysis—for
care.”).
72. Id. at 71 (“Thus, for instance, a renal transplant is a replacement therapy,
whereas peritoneal dialysis (although it also takes place inside the body) is a
substitutive therapy.”). His explanation for the ethical relevance of this distinction
strikes me, however, as question-begging:
Replacement therapies become part of the restored physiology of the
patient, part of the integrated unity of the patient as an intact individual
organism. To discontinue such therapies is better understood as
introducing a new lethal pathophysiological state rather than
discontinuing a treatment that is merely substituting for a preexisting
lethal pathophysiological lack of that function.
Id. at 72.
73. Id. at 71–72. He added that “[t]he paradigmatic replacement therapy is
thus a well-functioning organ transplant from an identical twin,” id. at 72, but that
is only because he made immunologic compatibility relevant—why exactly would it
raise less serious ethical concerns to discontinue an organ transplanted from an
unrelated donor that required more aggressive immunosuppression? Would an
artificial version of the same organ get pluses for immunologic compatibility to
offset minuses for an inability for growth and self-repair? Although Sulmasy
repeatedly emphasizes that he envisions a sliding scale without any “bright line” or
indispensable factors, see id. at 71–72, he still needs to provide some account for
why (and how much) one or more of these factors count in the ethical calculus, cf.
id. at 72 (“[T]his conclusion will doubtless prove challenging for persons
unaccustomed to philosophical thinking.”). Sulmasy closed by offering an
extended illustration of the difference he had in mind: a diabetic patient receiving
either insulin injections (clearly a “substitution” therapy that could be withdrawn
at the end of life) or islet cell transplantation (clearly a “replacement” therapy that
could not be destroyed by injecting streptozosin). See id. To use a harder case
between these two extremes that comes closer to the CIED deactivation question,
what about an implanted insulin pump, which in the near future may become fully
automated? See Natasha Singer, Insulin Dose More Finely Calculated, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
5, 2010, at B1; “Artificial Pancreas” Shows Real Promise, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 26,
2011, at A6.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

19

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 7

1248

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:4

instance, why exactly would fully implanted mechanical
replacement organs not make the cut (is he relying on a
74
natural/artificial distinction that others have rejected)? Although
he never said so explicitly (and sought mainly to defend ICD
deactivation), Sulmasy evidently would exclude pacemakers and
75
LVADs as well.
C.

Peculiarities of Pacemakers and LVADs

Requests for pacemaker deactivation appear to pose trickier
76
ethical questions. First, unlike ICDs that may fire repeatedly in
77
dying patients (adding to their pain and distress), pacemakers
74. For instance, FDA officials have rejected the natural/artificial distinction
in regulating medical devices. See Ala. Tissue Ctr. v. Sullivan, 975 F.2d 373, 378
(7th Cir. 1992) (dismissing a challenge to the agency’s decision to treat heart valve
allografts as devices); see also 21 C.F.R. pt. 1271 (2012) (outlining the FDA’s
approach to human cells, tissues, and cellular and tissue-based products). For
more general flaws with the natural/artificial distinction, see Jansen, supra note 59,
at 107 (concluding that instead it is “the distinction between what is a component
of the self and what is alien or extrinsic to the self”); Robert D. Truog & Thomas I.
Cochrane, Refusal of Hydration and Nutrition: Irrelevance of the “Artificial” vs “Natural”
Distinction, 165 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2574, 2575–76 (2005).
75. In contrast, one pair of commentators used Sulmasy’s framework to argue
that pacemaker deactivation in pacemaker-dependent patients would differ from
the permissible deactivation of ICDs. See G. Neal Kay & Gregory T. Bittner,
Deactivating Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillators and Permanent Pacemakers in Patients
with Terminal Illness: An Ethical Distinction, 2 CIRCULATION: ARRHYTHMIA &
ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 336, 338 (2009). But see Richard A. Zellner et al., Deactivating
Permanent Pacemaker in Patients with Terminal Illness: Patient Autonomy Is Paramount, 2
CIRCULATION: ARRHYTHMIA & ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 340, 342 (2009) (“Using
Sulmasy’s criteria, if an ICD is substitutive, with its continuous sensing capacity, so
too is a pacemaker. . . . Implanting the device under the skin does not change the
nature of the device, only its location. Like pacemakers, [LVADs] are likely to
become internalized.”).
76. See Ron Shasby et al., Ethical Issues in the Management of Geriatric Cardiac
Patients: A Family Member with Power of Attorney for an 87 Year Old Patient Is Requesting
Removal of the Patient’s Pacemaker, 7 AM. J. GERIATRIC CARDIOLOGY 48 (1998); Case
Study, Retiring the Pacemaker, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.–Feb. 1997, at 24 (focusing
on collateral issues); see also Tia P. Powell, Life Imitates Work, 305 JAMA 542 (2011)
(offering a bioethicist’s first-hand account of struggling over whether to consent to
the implantation of a pacemaker in her cognitively impaired mother); Katy Butler,
My Father’s Broken Heart, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 20, 2010, at 38 (offering a personal
perspective after a frail parent received a pacemaker).
77. See Nathan E. Goldstein et al., Management of Implantable Cardioverter
Defibrillators in End-of-Life Care, 141 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 835, 836 (2004) (finding
that more than a quarter of dying patients received ICD shocks during their last
month); id. at 837 (reporting that “the next of kin found it distressing to witness
the patient being shocked at the end of life”); William R. Lewis et al., Withdrawing
Implantable Defibrillator Shock Therapy in Terminally Ill Patients, 119 AM. J. MED. 892,
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generally continue to function unnoticed, maintaining a steady
cardiac rhythm. Thus, pacemakers in no way interfere with the
78
dying process apart from possibly prolonging it.
Second,
pacemakers are not as easily deactivated as ICDs—health care
personnel cannot simply shut them off with a programming device
79
or a strong magnet. Instead, the programmer must dramatically
80
reduce the pacing rate and voltage. Third, unlike recipients of
ICDs that may never fire (making their deactivation of little
81
practical consequence), some patients become pacemaker82
dependent, leading a few commentators to view deactivation in
83
Although these
such cases as amounting to active euthanasia.
892–93, 895 (2006); Michelle A. Mullen & Robert M. Gow, Understanding Ethical
Issues, ICD, and DNR Orders: An Obstacle to Imminent Death?, 7 HEART RHYTHM 858,
859 (2010) (“[R]epeated discharges of the ICD can dramatically exacerbate
suffering during the dying process.”).
78. See Jill A. Rhymes et al., Withdrawing Very Low-Burden Interventions in
Chronically Ill Patients, 283 JAMA 1061, 1062 (2000) (“[T]here is no clinically
significant iatrogenic burden in allowing the pacemaker to continue to
function.”); see also Beca et al., supra note 32, at 237 (“[T]he patient’s agony was
extended for more than a week only by the pacemaker’s action. . . . [T]he
presence of a [pacemaker] can actually postpone death.”).
79. See Michael Thomas Beets & Edward Forringer, Urgent Implantable
Cardioverter Defibrillator Deactivation by Unconventional Means, 42 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM
MGMT. 941, 945 (2011); Stein, Devices Can Interfere, supra note 2, at A1 (“Large,
specialized doughnut-shaped magnets can disable ICDs in an emergency. And
programming devices can permanently deactivate ICDs wirelessly.”).
80. See Ted C. Braun et al., Cardiac Pacemakers and Implantable Defibrillators in
Terminal Care, 18 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 126, 127 (1999); Wilkoff et al., supra
note 8, at 919–20. Conversely, ICDs need not get shut off completely. See James E.
Russo, Deactivation of ICDs at the End of Life: A Systematic Review of Clinical Practices
and Provider and Patient Attitudes, AM. J. NURSING, Oct. 2011, at 26, 33 (noting that
intermediate options exist for reprogramming ICDs, “such as lengthening the
detection interval, limiting the number of shocks, or deactivating the shock
function while retaining antitachycardia pacing”).
81. See Goldstein et al., supra note 34, at 5 (“The interval between ICD
deactivation and patient death may be much longer [than happens upon the
withdrawal of hemodialysis or ventilators] given the unpredictable nature of
malignant arrhythmias.”); see also Sulmasy, supra note 56, at 70 (“[T]he very fact
that it functions only intermittently might make it psychologically easier to
deactivate an ICD than to deactivate the pacemaker of a patient with complete
heart block.”).
82. See Classification of Implantable Pacemaker Pulse Generators, 44 Fed.
Reg. 13,373, 13,373 (proposed Mar. 9, 1979) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 870)
(noting that “patients may be totally dependent upon this device for their
continued survival”); Panagiotis Korantzopoulos et al., Pacemaker Dependency After
Implantation of Electrophysiological Devices, 11 EUROPACE 1151, 1154 (2009)
(“Pacemaker dependency is observed in an appreciable number of paced patients
after implantation . . . .”).
83. See Basta, supra note 32, at 116 (An ICD may be inactivated at the end-of-
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features explain why some clinicians hesitate when pacemaker
patients request device withdrawal, most ethicists view these
differences as inconsequential and would allow for pacemaker
84
deactivation on the same grounds as ICD deactivation.
Only rarely have ethicists given LVADs more than passing
85
attention. As Dr. Quill had done before him, Dr. Mueller
extended his defense of ICD deactivation to such implanted heart
86
pumps. In 2008, a brief case study published in the Hastings Center
Report—a prominent bioethics journal—provided the competing
87
views of Jeremy Simon and Ruth Fischbach. Dr. Simon thought it
life because it “may interfere with the natural process of dying peacefully.
However, this is not true with a pacemaker, since it is considered to have become
an integral part of the heart. Therefore, changing pacemaker parameters to
hasten the patient’s death is a form of euthanasia . . . .”); Lofty L. Basta, Ethical
Issues in the Management of Geriatric Cardiac Patients: A Patient Asks to Put an End to the
Nightmare of Living with a Lifesaving AIDC, 11 AM. J. GERIATRIC CARDIOLOGY 326, 327
(2002) (“In a pacemaker-dependent patient, disabling or removing the pacemaker
represents an active intervention, the intent of which is to cause death.”); Lofty L.
Basta, Reply to Letter to the Editor, When Is Deactivation of Artificial Pacing and
AICD Illegal, Immoral, and Unethical?, 12 AM. J. GERIATRIC CARDIOLOGY 275, 275–76
(2003) (elaborating); Kay & Bittner, supra note 75, at 338.
84. See Ballentine, supra note 32, at 18; Beca et al., supra note 32, at 239 (“If
the [pacemaker] sustains the patient’s life by means of an artificial cardiac rhythm,
its deactivation should be considered just a way to avoid therapeutic obstinacy, not
a way to cause death.”); Berger, supra note 39, at 631 (“[T]he ethical
considerations in decisions to deactivate ICDs may similarly apply to . . .
pacemakers.”); Kapa et al., supra note 49, at 988; Rachel Lampert & David Hayes,
Letter, Pacemakers and End-of-Life Decisions, 305 JAMA 1858 (2011); Mueller et al.,
supra note 45, at 566; Edmund D. Pellegrino, Decisions to Withdraw Life-Sustaining
Treatment: A Moral Algorithm, 283 JAMA 1065, 1067 (2000); Rhymes et al., supra
note 78, at 1063 (“[D]eactivating this patient’s pacemaker is not killing in the
sense of introducing a new pathology that causes death.”); Jeffrey Spike,
Commentary, Retiring the Pacemaker, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.–Feb. 1997, at 25,
26 (“[A] pacemaker is more like an implantable defibrillator than any other
medical device, and turning that off should be as acceptable as signing a DNR [Do
Not Resuscitate] (or a DNAR, Do Not Attempt Resuscitation) order since they are
functionally and ethically isomorphic.”); Sandra N. Whitlock et al., Is Pacemaker
Deactivation at the End of Life Unique?: A Case Study and Ethical Analysis, 14 J.
PALLIATIVE MED. 1184, 1185–87 (2011); Wiegand & Kalowes, supra note 39, at 421–
22; Zellner et al., supra note 75, at 341–43.
85. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
86. See Paul S. Mueller et al., Ethical Analysis of Withdrawing Ventricular Assist
Device Support, 85 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 791, 795–97 (2010) (discussing causation,
intent, and similarity to withdrawal of ventilators). Unlike Quill, these authors had
reviewed several case studies in detail, and they did recognize that LVADs
appeared to raise some special concerns before dismissing these as ethically
irrelevant. See id. at 794–95.
87. Case Study, “Doctor, Will You Turn off My LVAD?,” HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Jan.–Feb. 2008, at 14 (including commentaries by Jeremy Simon and Ruth
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“tantamount to removing the patient’s heart.”
Although
89
cognizant of the limitations in drawing this parallel, he focused on
the functional similarities between such a mechanical implant and
a transplanted organ insofar as both become “integrated” in
90
patients so that they then can function independently. Professor
Fischbach dismissed Dr. Simon’s effort to equate LVADs with
91
transplanted organs, emphasizing instead the device’s similarities
Fischbach, both of whom now serve on the medical school faculty at Columbia
University). Five years earlier, a similar exchange (though focused on TAHs
rather than LVADs) had appeared in the pages of the wonderfully obscure journal
Death Studies. Compare Robert M. Veatch, Inactivating a Total Artificial Heart: Special
Moral Problems, 27 DEATH STUD. 305, 307–10 (2003) (expressing some
reservations), with Katrina A. Bramstedt, Replying to Veatch’s Concerns: Special Moral
Problems with Total Artificial Heart Inactivation, 27 DEATH STUD. 317, 318–19 (2003)
(defending deactivation), and Katrina A. Bramstedt, Elective Inactivation of Total
Artificial Heart Technology in Non-Futile Situations: Inpatients, Outpatients and Research
Participants, 28 DEATH STUD. 423, 427–29 (2004) (same).
88. Jeremy R. Simon, Commentary, “Doctor, Will You Turn off My LVAD?,”
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.–Feb. 2008, at 14, 15; see also id. at 14 (“We would not
remove a patient’s biological heart, transplanted or native, simply because the
patient was suffering greatly from heart failure and did not want to go on; nor
should we disable his LVAD.”).
89. See id. at 14 (“Although LVADs are neither fully implantable nor a full
replacement for a heart, they share many ethically relevant features with true
artificial organs.”). The hypothetical case had stipulated that “many of the
device’s controls, as well as its power source (a rechargeable battery), are outside
the patient and connected to the pump by tubes and wires that pass through the
patient’s abdominal wall.” Id. These differences added to Dr. Simon’s misgivings
insofar as they meant that an ambulatory patient could have disconnected the
device himself—and the patient’s evident discomfort with doing so suggested that
he viewed deactivation as suicide. See id. at 15 (“The fact that the patient does not
want to take action on his own, however, does not authorize others to hasten his
death for him.”); id. (adding that the physician who declines to assist should
“perhaps make it clear to [the patient] that he has the means to do so himself”).
This aspect of the hypothetical would, of course, fall away if the patient could not
act on his own or in the case of a fully implantable device.
90. Id. at 14 (“The fact that the LVAD is manufactured and partially external
is less important than the fact that it forms an integrated part of an independently
functioning organism.”); see also id. (“Once the patient leaves the hospital, the
LVAD ceases to be a medical treatment and becomes effectively part of the patient
himself, much like a transplanted organ or even a native one.”); id. (calling the
LVAD cases a “harbinger . . . of a much larger group [of patients] we will
undoubtedly soon encounter—those who have implanted artificial organs
essential to their survival”).
91. See Ruth L. Fischbach, Commentary, “Doctor, Will You Turn off My LVAD?,”
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.–Feb. 2008, at 15, 15 (“After an organ is implanted, it
becomes part of the patient and its functioning is relatively independent.
However, an LVAD is not itself a vital organ and requires external power,
anticoagulation therapy, and consistent maintenance.”). This entirely disregards
the necessity for chronic use of antirejection drugs after organ transplantation. See
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to other forms of external life-sustaining treatments that physicians
92
may withdraw under appropriate circumstances, and she added
that its deactivation simply would allow a patient to die of natural
93
causes.
D.

Reaching a Consensus of Sorts

Objections to the prevailing view appear only rarely in the
94
Recently, a pair of commentators took the position
literature.
that, unless a patient faces imminent death from an unrelated
cause (e.g., massive stroke or multiple organ failure), CIED
deactivation qualifies as the cause of the patient’s demise and
amounts to an unnatural (and, hence, impermissibly physician95
aided) death.
Alex Gutierrez-Dalmau & Josep M. Campistol, Immunosuppressive Therapy and
Malignancy in Organ Transplant Recipients: A Systematic Review, 67 DRUGS 1167
(2007).
92. See Fischbach, supra note 91, at 15 (“[T]he device is similar to other forms
of advanced life support, such as ventilators, which are routinely discontinued in
accordance with patients’ wishes in terminal extubation.”); id. (“Since the
functioning of an LVAD depends on external power sources and pharmaceutical
maintenance, removing those externalities is akin to the passive euthanasia that
physicians already perform.”).
93. See id. (“If the LVAD is disabled, death will occur due to heart failure, not
medical intervention—a consolation to one who opposes suicide.”); see also Stein,
Heart Pump, supra note 2, at A1 (quoting Timothy W. Kirk, a bioethicist at
Villanova University: “It is not assisted suicide or euthanasia [to deactivate an
LVAD], because what’s killing them is the underlying disease.”). But see id.
(quoting James Kirkpatrick, a cardiologist and ethicist at the University of
Pennsylvania: “This is unlike anything else we deactivate. . . . When you turn off
an LVAD, it can make the person worse. You can basically worsen the heart
function. So you’re not just stopping something and letting nature take its
course.”); Katrina A. Bramstedt & Neil S. Wenger, When Withdrawal of LifeSustaining Care Does More Than Allow Death to Take Its Course: The Dilemma of Left
Ventricular Assist Devices, 20 J. HEART & LUNG TRANSPLANTATION 544, 545–46 (2001)
(noting the possibilities of back flow, pooling, and regurgitant flow of blood as
well as disruption of the heart’s contractility after deactivation); id. at 546
(“[L]eaving an implanted and yet unpowered LVAD in place actually impedes
natural heart function.”).
94. As mentioned previously, a distinct minority of commentators view device
deactivation in pacemaker-dependent patients as active euthanasia. See supra notes
83–84 and accompanying text.
95. See Mohamed Y. Rady & Joseph L. Verheijde, Letter, When Is Deactivating
an Implanted Cardiac Device Physician-Assisted Death? Appraisal of the Lethal
Pathophysiology and Mode of Death, 14 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 1086, 1086–87 (2011).
Critically, they did not view the underlying cardiovascular disease that necessitated
CIED treatment as life-threatening insofar as patients view the “implanted devices
as a permanent cure of their preexisting disease.” Id. at 1086; see also id.
(“[D]eactivating [CIEDs] in device-dependent patients sets off a lethal
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For example, a pacemaker-dependent patient wishing to
end his life asks his physician to assist with premedication
and pacemaker deactivation for a rapid death. The lethal
pathophysiology is electric asystole and circulatory arrest
brought about by pacemaker deactivation. . . . However,
deactivating the pacemaker in a similar patient after an
acute brainstem infarction sustaining a lethal
pathophysiology from apnea and pulselessness is not
96
assisted death but natural death.
Their causation-focused analysis arguably proves too much,
however, insofar as it seemingly also would bar withdrawing
97
Then again,
treatment from ventilator-dependent patients.
perhaps it just demonstrates that this oft-invoked line of
98
demarcation lacks coherence.
After fifteen years of debate in the medical literature, the views
of those defending the ethics of CIED deactivation secured official
endorsement in 2010. The Heart Rhythm Society (HRS), along
with half a dozen other professional groups (including the
American College of Cardiology and the American Heart
Association), produced a “consensus statement” covering the
subject, with several of the individuals who previously had penned
99
defenses of deactivation listed as co-authors.
The report
pathophysiology of its own causing death even in the absence of life-threatening
illness. . . . Having precise control over time, place, and method or mode of death
qualifies it as assisting death.”).
96. Id. at 1087; see also id. (“In the absence of life-threatening illness,
deactivating [CIEDs] that replace native cardiac function interrupts normal
circulation and constitutes the new lethal pathophysiology (mode of death) in a
device-dependent patient.”). For a harsh response, see Stuart, supra note 41, at
1089–90 (critiquing their position as almost heretical).
97. See infra notes 110–23 and accompanying text (discussing judicial analysis
of such a case); see also Lawrence J. Schneiderman & Roger G. Spragg, Ethical
Decisions in Discontinuing Mechanical Ventilation, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 984, 988
(1988). Indeed, this same pair of commentators previously had co-authored with
others a paper about LVADs that treated deactivation as largely unremarkable. See
Aaron G. Rizzieri et al., Ethical Challenges with the Left Ventricular Assist Device as a
Destination Therapy, 3 PHIL. ETHICS & HUMAN. MED. no. 20, at 10–12 (2008).
98. See David Orentlicher, The Legalization of Physician Assisted Suicide: A Very
Modest Revolution, 38 B.C. L. REV. 443, 446–62 (1997) (finding no meaningful
differences between treatment withdrawals and assisted suicide). For instance,
Professor Orentlicher explained that “patients who die when treatment is
withdrawn also die an unnatural death,” and he offered the following illustration
(without, however, any further elaboration): “[W]hen a person has had an
artificial heart valve or a cardiac pacemaker implanted, the patient is now at a new
baseline in terms of her physical condition.” Id. at 449.
99. See Rachel Lampert et al., HRS Expert Consensus Statement on the
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emphasized the importance of improving dialogue about the
100
Viewing the
question between physicians and their patients.
matter as no different than requests to withdraw other forms of life101
sustaining treatment,
buttressed by the previously described
102
points about causation and intent, the HRS consensus statement
concluded as follows: “Deactivation of a CIED, whether a
pacemaker, ICD or other device is not assisted suicide or
103
euthanasia and is ethically and legally permissible.”
In spite of
104
the mildly remarkable confidence expressed in the report, an
Management of Cardiovascular Implantable Electronic Devices (CIEDs) in Patients Nearing
End of Life or Requesting Withdrawal of Therapy, 7 HEART RHYTHM 1008 (2010); id. at
1009 (“Agreement [among members of the expert panel] was greater than 90%
on all recommendations.”); see also Luigi Padeletti et al., EHRA Expert Consensus
Statement on the Management of Cardiovascular Implantable Electronic Devices in Patients
Nearing End of Life or Requesting Withdrawal of Therapy, 12 EUROPACE 1480 (2010)
(offering similar guidance from the European counterpart of HRS). For a critical
assessment of such consensus efforts, see Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology:
Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L.
REV. 373, 420–21 & n.204, 428–29 n.241 (2002).
100. See Lampert et al., supra note 99, at 1013, 1015–19; see also Goldstein, supra
note 77, at 837 (“[W]e found that clinicians rarely discuss deactivating ICDs with
patients, even those patients who are perceived to be near death or those who had
previously expressed a desire to limit life-prolonging therapy.”); id.
(“Conversations about deactivation, as well as the actual turning off of the device,
occurred not as decisions planned well in advance of the patient’s death but as
reactions to distress in the days, hours, or minutes before the patient died.”). The
HRS report also outlined some of the logistics involved in the process of CIED
deactivation. See Lampert et al., supra note 99, at 1019–22.
101. See Lampert et al., supra note 99, at 1009 (“The right to refuse or request
the withdrawal of a treatment is a personal right of the patient and does not
depend on the characteristics of the particular treatment involved (i.e., CIEDs).
Therefore, no treatment, including CIED therapies, has unique ethical or legal
status.”); id. at 1011 (“[T]here is no ethical or legal distinction between a
treatment that’s integrated within the body, versus one which is outside the
body.”).
102. See id. at 1009, 1011.
103. Id. at 1014. Although framed broadly enough to cover LVADs, the report
never once mentioned these devices, except as a possible alternative treatment to
pacemakers or ICDs. See id. at 1017 (“Patients with worsening congestive heart
failure may be candidates for advanced therapies such as left ventricular assist
devices or cardiac transplantation.”). Two years earlier, a consensus statement cosponsored by HRS that focused on the monitoring of CIEDs had included a
definition not covering LVADs. See Wilkoff et al., supra note 8, at 908; see also id. at
919–21 (previewing the ethical issues associated with CIED deactivation); Andrew
E. Epstein et al., ACC/AHA/HRS 2008 Guidelines for Device-Based Therapy of Cardiac
Rhythm Abnormalities, 117 CIRCULATION e350, e388–89 (2008) (same).
104. See Lampert et al., supra note 99, at 1011 (“[T]he legal precedents and
ethical principles are unambiguous—a patient has the right to refuse and request
the withdrawal of CIED therapies regardless of whether s/he is terminally ill or
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ethical consensus in favor of the practice informs but ultimately
105
cannot settle questions about its legality.
IV. STRADDLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY LINES
For more than a quarter of a century, judges, legislators, and
commentators have given end-of-life legal questions plenty of
attention, but they have had essentially nothing to say about the
deactivation of implanted cardiac-assist devices. After summarizing
the United States Supreme Court’s general guidance, which for the
most part has left the matter to state legislation, I suggest some ways
of addressing this unique problem.

not, and regardless of whether . . . death would follow as a consequence of a
decision not to use them.” (emphasis added)); id. at 1010 (“[E]ven though the
Supreme Court has not specifically commented on the question of PM or ICD
deactivation, because CIEDs deliver life-sustaining therapies, discontinuation of
these therapies is clearly addressed by the above Supreme Court precedents
upholding the right to discontinue life-sustaining treatment.” (emphasis added));
see also id. at 1009 (“Because ethics and law are closely aligned, they are considered
together in this section.”). Subsequent commentators thereupon viewed the
matter as settled, treating physicians or patients who expressed qualms about
CIED deactivation as misguided. See Kramer et al., supra note 47, at 1539
(“Deficiencies in physicians’ legal knowledge were more pronounced for questions
related to cardiac devices.”); id. at 1540–41 (citing the HRS guidelines for the
proposition that “there is no meaningful distinction in the law or among ethicists
regarding different life-sustaining therapies, such as mechanical ventilation,
feeding tubes, dialysis, and cardiac devices”); Kramer et al., supra note 33, at 1073
(“Widespread uncertainty was found [among patients] regarding the legal status
of CIED deactivation . . . .”); id. at 1074 (citing, among other sources, the HRS
guidelines for the proposition that “neither PM-dependence nor a patient’s
prognosis influence the legality of device deactivation”).
105. See Kapa et al., supra note 49, at 987 (“The withdrawal of ICD therapy at
the end of life . . . is generally thought to be ethically permissible. However, the
legality of this is not as clear, in part due to the lack of court cases focusing
specifically on withdrawal of implantable cardiac device therapy.” (endnotes
omitted)); see also Alan Meisel, The Legal Consensus About Forgoing Life-Sustaining
Treatment: Its Status and Its Prospects, 2 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 309, 314 (1992)
(“[T]he law has been substantially influenced by the changing attitudes in clinical
practice. Clinical practice exists in an iterative relationship with the law, and viceversa.”). For a scathing critique of legal interpretation undertaken by medical
ethicists in a different context, see Lars Noah, Coerced Participation in Clinical Trials:
Conscripting Human Research Subjects, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 330, 342–66 (2010); id.
at 355 (“[A]s an exercise in legal analysis, their defense of the CSP policy comes
across as entirely amateurish.”). Conversely, future judicial (or legislative)
endorsement of CIED deactivation would hardly resolve any lingering ethical
uncertainties about the practice. See Jansen, supra note 59, at 111.
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Tentative Judicial Guideposts

In 1990, the Supreme Court decided Cruzan v. Director,
106
The petitioner had sustained
Missouri Department of Health.
permanent brain damage that left her in a persistent vegetative
state, and her parents went to court seeking permission to withdraw
the gastrostomy tube that supplied life-sustaining nutrition and
107
hydration.
The high Court framed the question very narrowly,
asking only whether the state could constitutionally require a
surrogate decisionmaker to present “clear and convincing
evidence” of Ms. Cruzan’s wishes in order to permit the withdrawal
of treatment, and it concluded that this standard did not
impermissibly infringe on the petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment
108
liberty interests.
The Court had assumed for the sake of
argument that patients enjoyed a constitutional right to refuse
109
unwanted medical treatment.
Just six months after the decision in Cruzan, the Nevada
110
Supreme Court issued its opinion in McKay v. Bergstedt.
A
ventilator-dependent quadriplegic had sought a judicial decree to
111
facilitate his desire to remove the respirator.
The trial judge
112
ruled in the petitioner’s favor, and, while an appeal to the state’s
highest court was pending, Kenneth Bergstedt died after his father
113
disconnected the tracheostomy tube.
Even though Kenneth’s
114
demise rendered the case moot, the Nevada Supreme Court
issued a lengthy opinion affirming the trial judge’s order.
The majority in McKay accepted the district court’s findings
106. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
107. See id. at 266–68.
108. See id. at 280–87.
109. See id. at 279 (“[F]or purposes of this case, we assume that the United
States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected
right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.”); id. at 287–89 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
110. 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990).
111. See id. at 620 (Petitioner sought “an order permitting the removal of his
respirator by one who could also administer a sedative and thereby relieve the
pain that would otherwise precede his demise. [He] also sought an order of
immunity from civil or criminal liability for anyone providing the requested
assistance.”).
112. Judge OKs Quadriplegic’s Plea to Die, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 1990, at A29.
113. Man in Court Case on Suicide Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1990, at A6.
Kenneth’s father died one week later of lung cancer. Man Dies After Son Fulfilled
Wish to End Life Before Him, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1990, at A29.
114. See McKay, 801 P.2d at 619–20 (adding that the Attorney General had
made only a “token” effort on appeal).
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that Kenneth was mentally competent and conceded that, while his
near total paralysis was irreversible, he did not have any terminal
illness—after suffering a childhood swimming accident, Kenneth
had already lived more than two decades by virtue of the respirator
115
and could expect to do so for several more decades.
Given the
impending death of his terminally ill father, who had served as sole
caretaker during much of this time, Kenneth feared the prospect of
long-term institutionalization and asked that medical personnel
disconnect his ventilator and administer sedatives to blunt the
116
sensation of resulting suffocation.
The majority held that
Kenneth enjoyed common law and constitutional rights to decline
117
further treatment. It then carefully examined the state’s possible
countervailing interests—in preserving life, preventing suicide,
protecting third parties, preserving the integrity of the medical
profession, and encouraging the charitable and humane care of
persons with disabilities—before concluding that these did not
118
outweigh Kenneth’s rights.
After complaining about the majority’s decision to issue what
amounted to an advisory opinion in a case that the state had never
119
actively opposed in any event, the dissenting judge in McKay
disagreed with his colleagues’ characterization of the situation:
[A]fter twenty-three years of living and breathing in this
machine-aided manner, the whole process becomes
something quite more than mere medical treatment. The
mechanical breather becomes a new way of life for its
user, and life cannot go on without it. Mr. Bergstedt lived
at home. The “treatment” in any real sense is over; and
just as heart pace-makers, artificial venous or arterial shunts,
115. See id. at 620.
116. See id. at 620, 624–25; cf. Peter Applebome, Judge Rules Quadriplegic Can Be
Allowed to End Life, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1989, at A16 (discussing a similar case from
Georgia: “In a unique approach, [Larry] McAfee, a former civil engineer, helped a
friend design a timing device he can activate with his mouth that would allow him
to shut off his ventilator on his own.”); id. (“[H]e needed someone to administer a
sedative so he could die quietly and not experience the terrifying, suffocating
feeling that occurred when he briefly dislodged his ventilator.”).
117. See McKay, 801 P.2d at 621–22.
118. See id. at 622–28, 631–32; see also id. at 629–31 (recommending a more
expeditious procedure for considering such petitions). In its discussion of the
state’s interest in preserving the integrity of the medical profession, see id. at 627–
28, the majority failed to consider the possibility that patient requests for medical
assistance in discontinuing life-sustaining care might raise more serious problems
than initial patient refusals of such care.
119. See id. at 632–33 (Springer, J., dissenting).
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a variety of prosthetic devices and other such medically
sponsored and introduced artifacts may begin as a medical
treatment modality, the ventilator begins as a form of
medical treatment but ends up as an integral part of its
120
dependent user.
In effect, technological advances had turned previously fatal
injuries and conditions into manageable medical problems,
offering increasingly mundane (neither heroic nor extraordinary)
121
interventions. The dissent also emphasized that disconnection of
the ventilator would immediately and proximately cause the
petitioner’s death, making his request more akin to seeking
assistance in committing suicide, rather than that of a terminally ill
patient who simply wants to die with dignity, adding that the
majority’s mischaracterization allowed it to dodge the real and
much harder question of whether to ever allow physician-assisted
122
suicide.
120. Id. at 634 (emphasis added); see also id. at 634 n.6, 635 (quoting the
following statement from an amicus brief submitted by a disability rights
organization even though the court had rejected it for filing as tardy: “Life support
systems such as ventilators, electric wheelchairs, or other automated devices
enhancing one’s functions are real extensions of the person . . . .”).
121. See id. at 636 (“[T]he technical ability to keep a person with these kinds of
injuries alive by means of mechanical respiration has not been available for much
more than fifty years.”); see also WILLIAM H. COLBY, UNPLUGGED: RECLAIMING OUR
RIGHT TO DIE IN AMERICA 67–69 (2006) (tracing the history of ventilators); id. at
169 (“As medical technology began its advance in the 1970s, . . . pinning down
exactly how this ordinary-extraordinary distinction should apply proved as elusive
as defining what letting ‘nature take its course’ involved.”). The majority
recognized as much, though it held to a baseline that asked what prospects a
patient would enjoy in the absence of these advances. See McKay, 801 P.2d at 621
(majority opinion) (“Because many individuals find themselves facing a terminal
condition susceptible to indefinite suspension by medical intervention, the
question arises with increasing frequency and fervor concerning the extent to
which persons have the right to refuse an artificial extension of life.”); id. at 627.
Unlike a person bent on suicide, Kenneth sought no affirmative
measures to terminate his life; he desired only to eliminate the artificial
barriers standing between him and the natural processes of life and
death that would otherwise ensue with someone in his physical
condition. . . . [H]e asked no one to shorten the term of his natural life
free of the respirator. He sought no fatal potions to end life or hurry
death. In other words, Kenneth desired the right to die a natural death
unimpeded by scientific contrivances.
Id. at 625–26. The majority repeatedly used terms such as “artificial” and “radical”
to describe the interventions that had kept Kenneth alive.
122. See id. at 634 (Springer, J., dissenting) (“There was nothing natural about
Mr. Bergstedt’s death; he killed himself.”); id. at 636–37 (considering the
difficulties with recognition of such a right); id. at 637 (“We are not dealing here
with ‘overtreatment’ or unwanted prolongation of the dying process.”).
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Hypothetical variations of McKay might help to situate this
decision relative to questions about deactivating implanted cardiacassist devices, which the next section takes up at greater length.
Presumably, even the dissent would have allowed Kenneth
Bergstedt—if injured as an adult (without dependents) and
deemed competent at the time—to decline ventilator assistance
from the outset notwithstanding the inevitability of death as a
result. Would it make any difference if, after initially consenting to
use of such a device, Kenneth declined to replace it many years
123
later when the original unit or tubing began to fail?
Conversely, even the majority would have rejected a request by
Kenneth for medical assistance designed to halt respiration
through the administration of drugs, a question that the United
States Supreme Court would take up in due time. So much for the
extremes. Now imagine that a technology existed—namely, an
implanted pulmonary pacemaker—that allowed quadriplegics to
124
regain lung function by artificially signaling the diaphragm,
thereby freeing them of the need for connection to an external
ventilator; would the majority still allow Kenneth to receive medical
assistance in shutting off (or explanting) such a device for the
express purpose of allowing his original injury to run its course and
cause a “natural death”? If not, might a prognosis of impending
death from other causes affect the analysis?
Seven years after the decisions in Cruzan and McKay, the
123. The majority clearly thought not insofar as it regarded a request to
disconnect as tantamount to declining (further) treatment. See id. at 625 (majority
opinion) (“[W]e see no difference between the patient who refuses treatment and
the one who accepts treatment and later refuses its continuance because of a
resulting loss in the quality of life.”); id. at 628 (“Because a competent adult would
have enjoyed a qualified constitutional and common law right to refuse a lifesustaining attachment to a respirator in the first instance, there is no reason why
such an adult could not assert the same rights to reject a continuation of
respirator-dependency that has proven too burdensome to endure.”); see also
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 288 (1990) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (asking about the “degree of intrusion and restraint”); In re Quinlan,
355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976) (focusing on the extent of “bodily invasion,” which
in that case included a respirator).
124. Pacemakers do exist for other parts of the body (primarily the brain and
spinal cord), but currently these are merely used to help treat conditions such as
Parkinson’s tremor, depression, or chronic pain rather than for life-sustaining
purposes. See Melissa Healy, Which Patients Benefit Most from Parkinson’s Implant?,
BALT. SUN, Oct. 16, 2010, at 6A (reporting that, in the decade since the FDA
approved the first deep-brain stimulation device for tremor control, approximately
70,000 patients have received one); Ken Howard Wilan, Pacemakers Aren’t Just for the
Heart Anymore, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 8, 2005, at E1.
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United States Supreme Court confronted physician-assisted suicide
125
A group of doctors and patients had
in Washington v. Glucksberg.
sought a declaration that one state’s prohibition on aiding
someone to commit suicide violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Although all nine Justices concurred in
126
the judgment rejecting this challenge, members of the Court
disagreed about—and devoted most of their opinions to
delineating—the appropriate methodology for engaging in
substantive due process review.
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion exhaustively
surveyed the law’s treatment of suicide and those who assist with
127
“self-murder,” concluding that the claimed right was neither
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” nor “implicit
128
As only infringements of
in the concept of ordered liberty.”
129
fundamental rights would trigger strict scrutiny, the Court then
held that the State of Washington’s rationales for the prohibition
130
Even
on assisting suicide satisfied minimum rationality review.
125. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
126. Justice O’Connor filed a brief concurring opinion (purporting to join
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court, but seeming to deviate in
important respects), see id. at 736 (O’Connor, J., concurring), and four other
members of the Court filed opinions concurring in the judgment, see id. at 738
(Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 752 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 789 (Ginsburg,
J., concurring); id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
Except for Justice Souter’s
concurrence, these separate opinions applied equally to the Court’s
contemporaneous decision in the companion case Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793
(1997), discussed more fully below.
127. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710–19; id. at 719 (“Attitudes toward suicide
itself have changed since [the 13th century], but our laws have consistently
condemned, and continue to prohibit, assisting suicide. Despite changes in
medical technology and notwithstanding an increased emphasis on the
importance of end-of-life decisionmaking, we have not retreated from this
prohibition.”).
128. Id. at 721 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 723 (“[W]e are
confronted with a consistent and almost universal tradition that has long rejected
the asserted right, and continues explicitly to reject it today, even for terminally ill,
mentally competent adults. To hold for respondents, we would have to reverse
centuries of legal doctrine and practice, and strike down the considered policy
choice of almost every State.”); id. at 727 (“That many of the rights and liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not
warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and
personal decisions are so protected . . . .”); id. at 728 (“conclud[ing] that the
asserted ‘right’ to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause”).
129. See id. at 721.
130. See id. at 728–35 (discussing state interests in the preservation of life,
prevention of suicide and treatment of depression, protection of the integrity of
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though the Court reiterated Cruzan’s presumption that persons
131
enjoyed a fundamental right to refuse life-sustaining treatments,
Glucksberg’s various opinions offered little guidance on how to
132
distinguish that choice from physician-assisted suicide.
Even absent any fundamental right, state prohibitions against
aiding suicide could not irrationally distinguish between patient
refusals of life-sustaining treatment and physician-assisted suicide
without violating the Fourteenth Amendment. In a companion
case to Glucksberg decided on the same day, the Court rejected just
133
such an equal protection challenge.
A group of physicians and
terminally ill patients had argued that New York state laws
unconstitutionally differentiated between essentially identical
practices: one statute authorized competent patients to reject
resuscitation efforts, while another statute broadly criminalized
promoting suicide without exempting physicians caring for

the medical profession, protection of vulnerable groups, and prevention of a slide
toward euthanasia); id. at 735 (“We need not weigh exactingly the relative
strengths of these various interests. They are unquestionably important and
legitimate, and Washington’s ban on assisted suicide is at least reasonably related
to their promotion and protection.”). In the end, the Court left the question to
the legislative process. See id. at 735 (“Throughout the Nation, Americans are
engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and
practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to
continue, as it should in a democratic society.”); id. at 737 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring); id. at 786–89 (Souter, J., concurring). As it happens, Washington
subsequently legalized physician-assisted suicide. See infra note 207; see also
Kathryn L. Tucker, In the Laboratory of the States: The Progress of Glucksberg’s
Invitation to States to Address End-of-Life Choice, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1593, 1602–11
(2008) (discussing Oregon’s law and unsuccessful legalization efforts in
California).
131. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (“We have also assumed, and strongly
suggested, that the Due Process Clause protects the traditional right to refuse
unwanted lifesaving medical treatment.”); id. at 725 (“Given the common-law rule
that forced medication was a battery, and the long legal tradition protecting the
decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment, our assumption was entirely
consistent with this Nation’s history and constitutional traditions.”).
132. See id. at 725–26 (“[T]he two acts are widely and reasonably regarded as
quite distinct . . . . In Cruzan itself, we recognized that most States outlawed
assisted suicide—and even more do today—and we certainly gave no intimation
that the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment could be some-how
transmuted into a right to assistance in committing suicide.”). A couple of months
before the Supreme Court announced its decisions, Congress hedged its bets by
enacting the Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 1997. Pub. L. No. 105-12,
§ 3, 111 Stat. 23 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14402 (2012)). Without further defining
the relevant terms, the statute provides that it does not apply to “the withholding
or withdrawing of medical treatment or medical care.” 42 U.S.C. § 14402(b)(1).
133. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 808–09 (1997).
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134

terminally ill patients.
The Supreme Court declined to find the
135
explaining it as “the
two situations entirely comparable,
distinction between letting a patient die and making that patient
136
137
die.”
Although it conceded that gray areas could arise, the
Court emphasized that causation and intent serve as relevant
138
factors in drawing the distinction.
Given the Supreme Court’s decisions, arguable distinctions
139
among seemingly similar cases continue to matter, even if such
efforts ultimately fail to convincingly differentiate permissible
140
treatment withdrawals from impermissible physician aid in dying.
134. See id. at 796–98; see also id. at 806–07 (elaborating on the evolution of the
New York statutes). The Court conceded that the Equal Protection Clause
“embodies a general rule that States must treat like cases alike.” Id. at 799.
135. See id. at 800–01 (“[W]e think the distinction between assisting suicide
and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, a distinction widely recognized and
endorsed in the medical profession and in our legal traditions, is both important
and logical; it is certainly rational.” (footnote omitted)); cf. id. at 800 n.6 (“Of
course, as respondents’ lawsuit demonstrates, there are differences of opinion
within the medical profession on this question.”).
136. Id. at 807.
137. See id. at 807–08 (“Granted, in some cases, the line between the two may
not be clear . . . .”); see also Howard Brody, Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Courts:
Moral Equivalence, Double Effect, and Clinical Practice, 82 MINN. L. REV. 939, 961
(1998) (“The public policy distinction works precisely because many cases fit
nicely within the general categories, but there are also going to be messy cases
which sit on the fences.”).
138. See Vacco, 521 U.S. at 801 (“The distinction comports with fundamental
legal principles of causation and intent. First, when a patient refuses lifesustaining medical treatment, he dies from an underlying fatal disease or
pathology; but if a patient ingests lethal medication prescribed by a physician, he
is killed by that medication.”); id. at 802 (“The law has long used actors’ intent or
purpose to distinguish between two acts that may have the same result.”).
139. See Norman L. Cantor & George C. Thomas III, The Legal Bounds of
Physician Conduct Hastening Death, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 83, 86–87 (2000); Franklin G.
Miller et al., Assisted Suicide Compared with Refusal of Treatment: A Valid Distinction?,
132 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 470 (2000); Norton Spritz, Physician-Assisted Suicide:
Three Crucial Distinctions, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 869, 871–74 (1997); Daniel P.
Sulmasy, Killing and Allowing to Die: Another Look, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 55, 56–63
(1998) (trying to clarify the distinction based on specific intention and proximate
causation).
140. See Tom L. Beauchamp, The Justification of Physician-Assisted Deaths, 29 IND.
L. REV. 1173, 1200 (1996); id. at 1180 (noting that “in many complex cases the
elements of these notions are so intertwined as to almost defy neat classification”);
Cantor, supra note 44, at 1798–808; id. at 1816 (“[N]o convincing rationale
supports the prevailing distinction between killing and letting die. And the most
frequently voiced concern about [physician-assisted death]—the hazards of
abuse—does not seem significantly more threatening than in the case of [lifesustaining medical treatment].”); Cantor & Thomas, supra note 139, at 153–73
(elaborating); Alan Meisel, Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Common Law Roadmap for
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As many have noted, the act/omission distinction breaks down
141
quickly in this context.
Causal judgments about what triggered a patient’s death—the
underlying disease or the physician’s intervention—all too often lie
142
in the eye of the beholder.
Although less clear when a patient
refuses from the outset (leaving uncertainty about whether a
recommended intervention might have prolonged life), the
withdrawal of a life-sustaining intervention qualifies as a proximate
cause of a patient’s death, even if the death certificate lists the
143
underlying disease or condition. Intention suffers from the same
slippery quality. The majority in Quill contrasted a physician’s
assent to a patient’s refusal or request for withdrawal of lifesustaining treatment (as an intent to abide by the patient’s wishes)
with a physician’s prescription of lethal medication (as reflecting
144
an intent to cause death), but even the latter situation reflects the
145
physician’s intent to abide by the patient’s wishes, and substantial
State Courts, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 817, 856–57 (1997); id. at 823–25 (calling the
central distinction a necessary fiction); David Orentlicher, The Alleged Distinction
Between Euthanasia and the Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment: Conceptually
Incoherent and Impossible to Maintain, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 837.
141. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 296–97 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring); Neil M. Gorsuch, The Right to Assisted Suicide and
Euthanasia, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 645–46 (2000); Meisel, supra note 140,
at 826–32; Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die with Assistance, 105
HARV. L. REV. 2021, 2028–29 (1992); see also id. at 2040 (“Physician-assisted suicide
is not fundamentally different from the withholding or withdrawing of medical
treatment.”).
142. See Gorsuch, supra note 141, at 643–45; Alexander Morgan Capron, Death
and the Court, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.–Oct. 1997, at 25, 27 (“[A]s every ethics
committee member knows, this view of causation is much too simple, for every
event has many causes; a conclusion about causation simply reflects a judgment
about the right place to assign responsibility.”). Even so, speed and certainty of
demise do seem like relevant factors.
143. See Timothy E. Quill, Risk Taking by Physicians in Legally Gray Areas, 57 ALB.
L. REV. 693, 703 (1994); see also Orentlicher, supra note 140, at 840 (“When a
physician writes a prescription for a lethal dose of barbiturates, the physician’s role
in the patient’s death is more attenuated than is that of the physician who turns
off a ventilator on a patient who cannot breathe without assistance.”). In fact,
most deaths of patients in health care institutions spring from treatment
withdrawals. See Kathy Faber-Langendoen & Paul N. Lanken, Dying Patients in the
Intensive Care Unit: Foregoing Treatment, Maintaining Care, 133 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 886, 888 (2000); Charles L. Sprung et al., Changes in Forgoing Life-Sustaining
Treatments in the United States: Concern for the Future, 71 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 512, 513
(1996) (“Up to 79% of deaths in the ICU have been shown to occur after the
forgoing of life-prolonging therapies.”).
144. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 801–02 (1997).
145. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 750–51 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
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certainty that death will follow in the former situation would reflect
an intent to cause death even if not rising to the level of mens rea
146
under the criminal law.
B.

Situating Implanted Cardiac-Assist Devices

Academics have spilled plenty of ink commenting on these
147
legal issues, but, as far as I can tell, not one of them has
concurring).
146. See David Orentlicher, The Supreme Court and Terminal Sedation: Rejecting
Assisted Suicide, Embracing Euthanasia, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 947, 958 (1997); see
also Norman L. Cantor, On Hastening Death Without Violating Legal and Moral
Prohibitions, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 407, 411 (2006) (“[A] physician, even one
motivated by compassion, who enters a suffering pulmonary patient’s room and
without consent pulls the plug from the patient’s respirator is guilty of murder if
death follows from the physician’s action.”); Cantor & Thomas, supra note 139, at
94 n.41, 113–17 (rejecting the focus on specific intent); id. at 121–38 (explaining
that administration of high-dose analgesics for palliative purposes but with a high
likelihood of causing death could lead to prosecution). But see Gorsuch, supra
note 141, at 647–57, 700–02, 706 (defending reliance on intentionality); id. at
709–10 (“[A] meaningful moral-legal distinction exists based on intent: the right
to refuse need not involve any intention to die or kill, whereas the supposed right
to assisted suicide and euthanasia always does.”); cf. Miles J. Edwards & Susan W.
Tolle, Disconnecting a Ventilator at the Request of a Patient Who Knows He Will Then Die:
The Doctor’s Anguish, 117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 254, 256 (1992); Timothy E. Quill,
The Ambiguity of Clinical Intentions, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1039, 1040 (1993)
(“[M]ultilayered intentions are present in most, if not all, end-of-life decisions.”).
Futility judgments, see infra note 170, seem in some tension with these claims. In
any event, such questions do not arise solely in criminal law settings, though
liability issues normally relate to the opposite problem—namely, when physicians
encounter lawsuits for the “wrongful prolongation of life.” See Holly Fernandez
Lynch et al., Compliance with Advance Directives: Wrongful Living and Tort Law
Incentives, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 133, 139–48, 168–78 (2008); S. Elizabeth Wilborn
Malloy, Beyond Misguided Paternalism: Resuscitating the Right to Refuse Medical
Treatment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1035, 1060–69, 1075–91 (1998); Philip G.
Peters, Jr., The Illusion of Autonomy at the End of Life: Unconsented Life Support and the
Wrongful Life Analogy, 45 UCLA L. REV. 673 (1998).
147. See, e.g., Norman L. Cantor, Twenty-Five Years After Quinlan: A Review of the
Jurisprudence of Death and Dying, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 182 (2001); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Washington v. Glucksberg Was Tragically Wrong, 106 MICH. L. REV.
1501 (2008); Ronald Dworkin, Lecture, Euthanasia, Morality, and Law, 31 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 1147 (1998); David J. Garrow, The Right to Die: Death with Dignity in America,
68 MISS. L.J. 407 (1998); Neil M. Gorsuch, The Legalization of Assisted Suicide and the
Law of Unintended Consequences: A Review of the Dutch and Oregon Experiments and
Leading Utilitarian Arguments for Legal Change, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1347; Yale Kamisar,
Physician Assisted Suicide: The Problems Presented by the Compelling, Heartwrenching Case,
88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1121 (1998); Leon R. Kass & Nelson Lund, PhysicianAssisted Suicide, Medical Ethics and the Future of the Medical Profession, 35 DUQ. L. REV.
395 (1996); Penney Lewis, Rights Discourse and Assisted Suicide, 27 AM. J.L. & MED.
45 (2001); Stephen W. Smith, Some Realism About End of Life: The Current Prohibition
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considered on what side of the line to place requests to deactivate
148
A loose-leaf legal treatise
implanted cardiac-assist devices.
devoted to right-to-die issues recently added brief references to the
149
question, but, after citing the HRS consensus statement and a few
of the medical journal articles discussed previously, it simply
offered the conclusory statement that deactivating CIEDs qualified
150
as the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.
This strikes me as
far from self-evident.
Prescribing fatal doses of barbiturates—the prototypical form
of physician-assisted suicide considered in Glucksberg and Quill—
obviously differs from deactivating an implanted cardiac-assist
device, but the latter in turn differs from disconnecting tubes or
unplugging external life-support machinery, which state courts
generally have allowed. Does my original intuition—namely, that
“a heart transplant patient who fares poorly and regrets his choice
presumably would have no right to ask a surgeon simply to remove
the new organ or perhaps try to ‘deactivate’ it by applying a strong
151
electrical current” —help to situate the problem?
If that
and the Euthanasia Underground, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 55 (2007); Cass R. Sunstein, The
Right to Die, 106 YALE L.J. 1123 (1997); Melvin I. Urofsky, Justifying Assisted Suicide:
Comments on the Ongoing Debate, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 893
(2000); Symposium, Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide, 25 J. HEALTH POL.
POL’Y & L. 377 (2000) (book reviews); Symposium, Physician-Assisted Suicide: Facing
Death After Glucksberg and Quill, 82 MINN. L. REV. 885 (1998) (including
contributions from Robert Burt, Ezekiel Emanuel, and Yale Kamisar).
148. The closest that I could find was an old column authored by a group of
medical ethicists in a state bar journal. See Frederick Paola et al., Automatic
Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators (AICDS): Management Under New York State’s DNR
Law, N.Y. ST. B.J., Mar.–Apr. 1997, at 36, 37 (concluding that ICDs represent a
form of cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) so a “do not resuscitate” (DNR)
order would allow for their deactivation, but noting that, in the case study
presented, the family members disagreed because they thought that the device
“had, by then, become a part of the patient”); see also Aine McGeary & Anselm
Eldergill, Medicolegal Issues Arising When Pacemaker and Implantable Cardioverter
Defibrillator Devices Are Deactivated in Terminally Ill Patients, 50 MED. SCI. & L. 40, 41,
43 (2010) (offering a brief and somewhat confused perspective from the U.K.);
Orentlicher, supra note 98, at 449 (making a passing reference to pacemakers);
Thomas D. Manganello, Disabling the Pacemaker: The Heart-Rending Decision Every
Competent Patient Has a Right to Make, HEALTH CARE L. MONTHLY, Jan. 2000, at 3.
149. See ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF
END-OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING §§ 1A.13[C], 6.03[A1] (3d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2012)
(indicating that this material was added in 2011).
150. See id. at § 6-62 (“[D]isabling that device results in the patient’s death
from the underlying illness or condition that necessitated use of the device in the
first place, just as the withdrawal of any other life-sustaining treatment would.”).
151. See NOAH, supra note 1, at 1148; see also Simon, supra note 88, at 14–15
(suggesting the same parallel); Sulmasy, supra note 56, at 71 (“Certainly, this

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

37

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 7

1266

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:4

hypothetical describes an even more extreme and unpalatable
version of physician aid in dying, then does CIED deactivation
more closely resemble it or, as most ethicists have argued, remain
firmly in the same domain as the withdrawal of ventilators and
gastrostomy tubes (or advance directives rejecting any use of
152
external defibrillators for resuscitation)?
Deactivation differs from manually removing tubes or
unplugging equipment—physicians typically would not surgically
explant the life-saving device; instead, they would induce a retained
153
device to malfunction.
Surely, convincing an electrophysiologist
to reprogram a pulse generator so that it triggers a potentially fatal
154
arrhythmia would qualify as active euthanasia.
Perhaps the
intuition seems correct if one is talking about a heart transplant. Stopping the
function of a transplanted heart with an injection of KCl [potassium chloride]
seems morally no different from stopping a native heart with an injection of
KCl.”); Stein, Heart Pump, supra note 2, at A1 (quoting Robert Veatch, a prominent
bioethicist at Georgetown University: “If you think about stopping the left
ventricular assist device as something like stopping the heart, then you have to
deal with the possibility that this is an active killing.”); cf. Veatch, supra note 87, at
309 (“Throwing a switch that stops a TAH is more like injecting a drug that
paralyzes the heart muscle . . . . [This] would be considered direct, active killing.
How can it be that turning off the heart is any different?”). Dr. Mueller and his
associates distinguished such a case, though without anticipating these alternative
methods of “deactivating” a transplanted heart. See Mueller et al., supra note 86, at
795 (“Removing a [heart] valve or an organ is invasive and painful and therefore
introduces a new pathology (e.g., a surgical wound), whereas turning off a VAD is
noninvasive and painless and does not introduce a new pathology.”).
152. See England et al., supra note 63, at 539 (“ICDs are unique. Though not
organic, a patient may consider the implant as a part of his physical
being . . . . [A]n ICD is neither perfectly analogous with [an external] medical
device nor a biological transplant; these two models of thought represent
extremes between which we believe ICDs fall.”).
153. Imagine that, instead of disconnecting the endotracheal tube for a
ventilator (perhaps something about the patient’s condition would have made that
unduly cumbersome or extremely painful), a physician created a closed circuit so
that exhaled carbon dioxide or nitrogen rather than oxygen returned through the
intake tube—I trust that no one would call that simply withdrawing life-sustaining
treatment. Cf. Russel D. Ogden, Non-Physician Assisted Suicide: The Technological
Imperative of the Deathing Counterculture, 25 DEATH STUD. 387, 391–93 (2001)
(discussing a “closed circuit breathing system” called the Debreather); id. at 394
(describing “devices using cylinders of compressed [inert] gas”); Russel D. Ogden
et al., Assisted Suicide by Oxygen Deprivation with Helium at a Swiss Right-to-Die
Organisation, 36 J. MED. ETHICS 174, 175–76 (2010).
154. Actually, so would CIED deactivation, just as administering—as opposed
to merely prescribing for self-administration—a fatal drug dose goes beyond
physician-assisted suicide. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 785 (1997)
(Souter, J., concurring) (noting that “a physician who would provide a drug for a
patient to administer might well go the further step of administering the drug
himself; so, the barrier between assisted suicide and euthanasia could become
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principle of “double effect” (which basically overlooks the risk of
causing an adverse outcome that arises as a foreseeable but
unintended and unavoidable consequence of pursuing a laudable
purpose) would shield a physician who deactivates an implanted
cardiac-assist device in a terminally ill patient from criminal
charges. Normally this question arises when the administration of
controlled substances for palliative purposes may itself hasten
155
death.
Although shutting off an LVAD generally will pose an
156
immediate risk of death, deactivating an ICD or pacemaker rarely
would do so. If ICD withdrawal qualifies as a palliative measure,
then the physician’s knowledge that the procedure exposed the
patient to a heightened risk of death would not suffice to turn this
157
into active euthanasia.
The same reasoning would not, however,
158
apply to pacemaker deactivation.
porous”); see also Am. Med. Ass’n, Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Decisions
Near the End of Life, 267 JAMA 2229, 2233 (1992) (explaining that physicianassisted suicide “is contrary to the prohibition against using the tools of medicine to
cause a patient’s death” (emphasis added)). In the CIED context, assisted suicide
would arise where a physician instructs a patient about how to use a programmer
or magnets to shut off the device. Ultimately, however, this distinction would
make no difference, even in the few states (including Washington) that have
legalized physician-assisted suicide only by the prescription of certain drugs. See
infra note 207 and accompanying text.
155. See J. Andrew Billings & Larry R. Churchill, Monolithic Moral Frameworks:
How Are the Ethics of Palliative Sedation Discussed in the Clinical Literature?, 15 J.
PALLIATIVE MED. 709, 710–11 (2012); Charles Foster et al., The Double Effect Effect,
20 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 56, 66–69 (2011); Jeffrey T. Berger,
Rethinking Guidelines for the Use of Palliative Sedation, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May–
June 2010, at 32, 33–34.
156. See Larry A. Allen et al., Decision Making in Advanced Heart Failure: A
Scientific Statement from the American Heart Association, 125 CIRCULATION 1928, 1938
(2012) (explaining that LVAD deactivation would, on average, lead to death in
approximately 20 minutes); see also Bramstedt & Wenger, supra note 93, at 548
(“LVAD therapy is a relatively new medical technology that makes us aware of
wrinkles in end-of-life decisions that we may not have considered before.”).
157. See Ballentine, supra note 32, at 16; Lewis et al., supra note 77, at 896
(“Withdrawal of shock therapy when a patient has made the decision for comfort
care prevents painful shocks at the end of life.”); cf. Brody, supra note 137, at 946
(discussing application of the double effect principle to the removal of a
ventilator).
158. See Braun et al., supra note 80, at 128 (“[I]t is rare that disabling the
pacemaker will result in a swift and painless death. It is more likely it would result
in symptomatic bradycardia with slow and relentless failure of major organs and,
perhaps, an even poorer quality of death.”); Robert E. Enck, Editorial, Management
of Cardiac Devices as the End Nears, 22 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE MED. 7, 7 (2005)
(“[T]he issue of pacemaker deactivation is less clear-cut. Is this the double effect
in reverse? . . . This ultimately hastens death but then produces a slow, agonizing
end punctuated by heart failure.”); Lewis et al., supra note 77, at 896
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Questions of Ownership and Control
159

Perhaps a property law framework might facilitate analysis.
Ownership issues can get tricky upon device removal or recipient
160
death, but deactivation requests involve a device still inside a
161
162
living patient.
When you get an implant, it belongs to you;
163
No
patients literally may take these to the grave with them.
(“[D]iscontinuation of pacing therapy may worsen heart failure because of
complete atrioventricular block or lead to syncope. This study demonstrates that
continuing pacing therapies in pacemaker-dependent individuals did not
artificially prolong life . . . .”); Rhymes et al., supra note 78, at 1062 (“Because
there is no significant ongoing burden incurred by the pacemaker, double-effect
reasoning cannot be used to justify deactivating the pacemaker.”).
159. See England et al., supra note 63, at 539 (“Arguably, some other sort of
property law model (though not one concerned with fixtures) would be
unavoidable in cases where the patient has paid for the device. . . . [I]t is worth
briefly mentioning some of the relevant considerations that a property model
raises.”). These commentators made some inapt references to the duties of car
owners in the U.K. and ultimately sought only to make a far more limited claim—
namely, that physicians could not unilaterally deactivate an ICD on grounds of
futility (as they could in the case of an external device that remained under their
continued control). See id. at 539–40 (concluding that only patients or their
surrogates could demand deactivation); see also id. at 539 (“[H]e may be able to
claim a physical ownership that would prevent interference by a third party.”);
infra note 167 (elaborating). A consensus statement co-sponsored by HRS (and
which focused on monitoring rather than deactivation of CIEDs) cited this article
for the proposition that “[t]he decision to inactivate an ICD cannot be made
unilaterally by the patient’s medical provider.” Wilkoff et al., supra note 8, at 920.
160. Cf. Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 480–82 (6th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the plaintiff had a sufficient interest in her dead spouse’s corneas to
claim a deprivation of due process); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793
P.2d 479, 487–97 (Cal. 1990) (rejecting conversion claims after researchers
created a valuable cell line from a spleen removed from a patient). See generally
Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359 (2000). I
encountered these issues in 2000 while serving as a member of the expert advisory
panel for the National Institutes of Health’s technology assessment conference on
retrieving implanted medical devices for failure analysis.
161. See supra notes 60–73 and accompanying text (discussing the relevance of
an internal/external distinction).
162. See John H. Fielder & Jonathan Black, But Doctor, It’s My Hip!: The Fate of
Failed Medical Devices, 5 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 113, 124 (1995) (“Most implants
are purchased for patients by a third party. . . . [I]t seems clear that the patient
owns the device . . . .”); id. at 125 (“We advocate a strong presumption in favor of
the patient owning any medical device whether implanted or
explanted. . . . Implanted medical devices are (new) parts of one’s body and
should be treated as such, regardless of who has paid for them.”).
163. See Bharat K. Kantharia et al., Reuse of Explanted Permanent Pacemakers
Donated by Funeral Homes, 109 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 238, 239 (2012) (“Surveys of
morticians in [two cities] have indicated that nearly 19% of deceased patients
possess a cardiac device, and 85% of these are buried with these patients . . . .”); see
also William J. Groh, Editorial, You Shouldn’t Take It with You: Postmortem Device
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physician, hospital, curious manufacturer, jilted creditor, or
164
Contrast this with
regulatory agency may demand its return.
equipment used in hospitals (including external pacemakers,
165
defibrillators, and heart pumps),
which patients (and their
insurers) pay handsomely to use but have no right to retain.
Similarly, external life-sustaining devices used in the home typically
166
get leased.
If implanted cardiac-assist devices really do not differ from
other life-sustaining interventions, then physicians could deactivate
them on grounds of futility (in theory even without patient or
167
proxy consent, though in practice that seems highly unlikely).
Reuse, 9 HEART RHYTHM 215 (2012). In cases of cremation, however, pulse
generators first must get excised to guard against a possible explosion, and loved
ones sometimes find wire fragments from the leads among the ashes. See Braun et
al., supra note 80, at 130; Christopher P. Gale & Graham P. Mulley, Pacemaker
Explosions in Crematoria: Problems and Possible Solutions, 95 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 353,
354 (2002); Butler, supra note 76, at 38.
164. See James N. Kirkpatrick et al., Letter, Postmortem Analysis and Retrieval of
Implantable Pacemakers and Defibrillators, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1649, 1650 (2006)
(finding that ninety-three percent of funeral directors and embalmers in the
Chicago area responding to a survey “said that without the consent of the family, it
would not be appropriate to . . . remove the devices”); James N. Kirkpatrick et al.,
Reuse of Pacemakers and Defibrillators in Developing Countries: Logistical, Legal, and
Ethical Barriers and Solutions, 7 HEART RHYTHM 1623, 1626 (2010) (“Presuming that
in most circumstances patients own their devices and may control their disposition
after removal, the aforementioned pacemaker/defibrillator living will would allow
patients officially to authorize embalmers to remove pulse generators for donation
or return to the manufacturers . . . .”); cf. Gowri Ramachandran, Assault and Battery
on Property, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 253, 263–64 (2010) (“The intuition that once
something is internal to a physically continuous body it is properly thought of as
part of that body also seems to give force to fictitious horror scenarios in which
artificial organs are repossessed, in bloody scenarios, by heartless corporations.”).
165. Cf. Gorsuch, supra note 141, at 701–02 (“Patient[s] often reject treatment
because they . . . are tired of invasive tubes, or simply wish to leave the hospital and
go home.”); Simon, supra note 88, at 15 (focusing on portability: “If ventilators
become backpack devices attached to a tracheostomy in otherwise independent
patients, we may have to reassess our permissive attitude towards extubation.”); id.
at 14 (contrasting LVADs from “other life-support technologies [that] can be used
only in a professional health care setting with ongoing medical support”).
166. AEDs may represent an exception. See Barnaby J. Feder, Do It Yourself: The
Home Heart Defibrillator, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2005, at C1 (reporting that consumers
can purchase these nonprescription devices for less than $2000). In such a case, a
person no longer wanting to get resuscitated could simply instruct their caregivers
not to use the AED.
167. See England et al., supra note 63, at 539 (“Considering an ICD as a
continuing medical intervention permits a unilateral decision by a doctor to
deactivate the device, even if this is contrary to a patient’s wish.”); see also Berger,
supra note 39, at 633 (“Physicians of patients with limited physical or cognitive
function may assess continued use of ICDs as ‘futile.’ . . . This statement prompts

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

41

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 7

1270

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:4

Ownership normally means the freedom to make a range of
168
but here it means that
choices about disposition and use,
hospitals and their employees have transferred control of an item
169
over to a patient, which would prevent health care professionals
from unilaterally withdrawing the treatment on grounds of
170
futility.
If the patient wanted to stop using such an item, then it
a question the medical community has not yet answered: How ought already
implanted defibrillators be used in patients with limited life expectancies?”);
Katrina A. Bramstedt, Contemplating Total Artificial Heart Inactivation in Cases of
Futility, 27 DEATH STUD. 295, 301–03 (2003); Katrina A. Bramstedt, Editorial,
Destination Nowhere: A Potential Dilemma with Ventricular Assist Devices, 54 ASAIO J. 1,
2 (2008) (“[N]o therapy should be considered permanent. Often, there comes a
time when implanted therapies such as pacemakers, cardioverter defibrillators,
and VADs should be terminated before a patient is actually declared dead.”);
Padeletti et al., supra note 99, at 1482 (“[I]f the device has an ON/OFF button [as
ICDs do], then the physician has the power to withhold such treatment on the
grounds of futility, even if the patient demands otherwise.”); cf. Tia P. Powell &
Mehmet C. Oz, Editorial, Discontinuing the LVAD: Ethical Considerations, 63 ANNALS
THORACIC SURGERY 1223, 1223 (1997) (“[W]e have not encountered a case where
we found it necessary or appropriate to discontinue the LVAD in the face of
objections from a patient’s family.”). But see Veatch, supra note 87, at 311 (calling
Bramstedt’s conclusion “offensive”); id. at 311–14 (elaborating on his broader
objections to futility judgments); Wilkoff et al., supra note 8, at 920 (“The decision
to inactivate an ICD cannot be made unilaterally by the patient’s medical
provider.”).
168. See Roger F. Friedman, Comment, It’s My Body and I’ll Die If I Want To: A
Property-Based Argument in Support of Assisted Suicide, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 183, 204 (1995). For instance, patients may indicate a desire to donate their
CIEDs after death (or the decedents’ family members may do so). See Timir S.
Baman et al., Feasibility of Postmortem Device Acquisition for Potential Reuse in
Underserved Nations, 9 HEART RHYTHM 211, 213 (2012) (“The goal of our proposed
initiative is to create a reproducible model where funeral directors are given a
framework to consent families of loved ones for device removal prior to burial or
cremation.”); Timir S. Baman et al., Pacemaker Reuse: An Initiative to Alleviate the
Burden of Symptomatic Bradyarrhythmia in Impoverished Nations Around the World, 122
CIRCULATION 1649, 1650 (2010) (“[A] great majority of the patient population
with devices and the general public [are] willing to consent to cardiac device
removal for philanthropic reuse in underserved nations.”).
169. These questions arise when courts ask whether hospitals or surgeons fall
within the chain of distribution for purposes of applying strict products liability
after an implanted device causes injury. See Lars Noah, This Is Your Products
Liability Restatement on Drugs, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 839, 918 & n.343, 923–25 (2009).
170. See generally John M. Luce, A History of Resolving Conflicts over End-of-Life
Care in Intensive Care Units in the United States, 38 CRITICAL CARE MED. 1623 (2010);
Thaddeus Mason Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor to Unilaterally Refuse
Life-Sustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L. REV. 1 (2007); Robert D. Truog, Medical
Futility, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 985 (2009); Patrick Moore, Note, An End-of-Life
Quandary in Need of a Statutory Response: When Patients Demand Life-Sustaining
Treatment That Physicians Are Unwilling to Provide, 48 B.C. L. REV. 433 (2007);
Symposium, Medical Futility Issues, 18 HEALTH MATRIX 229 (2008); Pam Belluck,
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would require a new round of intervention by medical personnel
rather than their continued involvement with respect to something
that they retain ownership and control over. If the patient did not
want to stop using the device, then physician deactivation would
171
constitute homicide.
Along similar lines, a pair of physicians once suggested that
172
ICDs resemble “fixtures” added to real property.
The law of
fixtures attempts to define when personal property (e.g., a kitchen
appliance or a fence) becomes sufficiently integrated with the
structure or land so that, in the event of ambiguity, it normally
173
The authors of this
would get conveyed as part of the package.
article emphasized as follows:
[T]he ICD is an indwelling device and arguably has become
a part of the patient. In this way, it is distinguishable from
an external defibrillator [or] a ventilator . . . . The idea
that something can have such an ontologic
metamorphosis, becoming a part of something
theretofore disjoint, is intriguing and not without
174
precedent.
Even as Doctors Say Enough, Families Fight to Prolong Life, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2005,
§ 1, at 1.
171. See Veatch, supra note 87, at 311 (calling unilateral action by physicians to
deactivate TAHs “murder”). Similarly, I have no doubt that, if a CIED
malfunctions or is programmed incorrectly, cf. Mary Jane Rasmussen et al.,
Unintentional Deactivation of Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillators in Health Care
Settings, 77 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 855, 856 (2002) (discussing errors that may occur
after implantation), courts resolving wrongful death claims against the
manufacturer or physician would treat the device’s failure as the proximate cause
of death even if a preexisting disease process had made the patient vulnerable in
the event of such a failure, see Lars Noah, An Inventory of Mathematical Blunders in
Applying the Loss-of-a-Chance Doctrine, 24 REV. LITIG. 369, 390 & nn.69–70 (2005); see
also Wendland v. Sparks, 574 N.W.2d 327, 330 (Iowa 1998) (allowing loss-of-achance claim against a physician who unilaterally decided not to resuscitate a
patient suffering from numerous maladies); Beauchamp, supra note 140, at 1184.
172. See Frederick A. Paola & Robert M. Walker, Deactivating the Implantable
Cardioverter-Defibrillator: A Biofixture Analysis, 93 S. MED. J. 20, 21–22 (2000). Both
authors were affiliated with the University of South Florida’s College of Medicine,
and Dr. Paola also held a law degree.
173. See generally Ronald W. Polston, The Fixtures Doctrine: Was It Ever Really the
Law?, 16 WHITTIER L. REV. 455 (1995); Marc L. Roark, Groping Along Between Things
Real and Things Personal: Defining Fixtures in Law and Policy in the UCC, 78 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1437 (2010).
174. Paola & Walker, supra note 172, at 21; see also id. at 22 (“We believe that
the ICD falls into that gray zone, between unequivocal biofixtures (such as
transplanted allogenic organs) at one extreme and unequivocally extrinsic
medical treatments . . . at the other, where reasonable arguments can be made
characterizing it as one or the other.”); id. (“As indwelling devices like ICDs and
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They had, however, a fairly limited question in mind when drawing
this parallel—namely, what happens when a surrogate
decisionmaker consents to a “do not resuscitate” (DNR) order for
an incompetent patient who the physician later discovers to have
an ICD? The authors concluded that, under such circumstances,
175
the DNR should not authorize deactivation of the device.
They
clearly assumed that, absent an ambiguity, the physician could turn
176
evidently not appreciating the fact that their
off the ICD,
invocation of the law of fixtures and focus on the peculiarities
associated with a fully implanted device might cast serious doubt on
the legality of deactivation even upon a direct request from a
177
competent patient.
A focus on device ownership raises subsidiary questions about
the nature and scope of the treatment relationships between the
178
patient and different physicians. When a patient gets hooked up
pacemakers become more prevalent, physicians will increasingly confront this
complex set of issues.”).
175. See id. at 21 (“This distinction may provide an alternative basis for treating
the use of the ICD differently than conventional CPR and for not interpreting the
family’s consent to a DNR order as implicitly authorizing its deactivation.”); id. at
22 (“In our ICD case, we seek an answer to the question: What resuscitative
measures that were not explicitly forgone by the patient’s family may properly be
forgone in reliance on its consent to the DNR order?”).
176. See id. at 22 (“[T]he family might regard the ICD as an intrinsic part of
the patient . . . and conclude that deactivating the ICD is fundamentally different
from forgoing extrinsic treatments. In these circumstances, serious limitations are
placed on a physician’s liberty to interfere with the functioning of the device.”); cf.
Berger, supra note 39, at 631–33 (concluding on other grounds that a DNR order
does not invariably call for ICD deactivation).
177. Shortly afterwards, the authors alluded to this possibility. See Frederick
Paola & Robert M. Walker, Letter, Is It Ethical to Withdraw Low-Burden Interventions
in Chronically Ill Patients?, 284 JAMA 1380 (2000) (“[A]cts interfering with
pacemaker function would be more akin to killing than to letting die.”). Their
letter prompted a pair of generally dismissive responses. See Edmund D.
Pellegrino, Letter, Is It Ethical to Withdraw Low-Burden Interventions in Chronically Ill
Patients?—Reply, 284 JAMA 1381 (2000) (“This is a specious argument
because . . . [t]he pacemaker has not undergone any change in its nature and is
still a mechanical device.”); Jill A. Rhymes et al., Letter, Is It Ethical to Withdraw
Low-Burden Interventions in Chronically Ill Patients?—Reply, 284 JAMA 1381 (2000)
(“While Paola and Walker have proposed a very interesting line of ethical inquiry,
it is not yet sufficiently developed . . . .”); see also England et al., supra note 63, at
539 (“Allowing a duality whose resolution is purely determined by the patient’s
understanding may lead to a plurality of bad outcomes.”); Sulmasy, supra note 56,
at 69 (“This interesting foray into ontology and ethics raises many more questions
than it answers . . . .”).
178. See generally BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 6-1 (2d ed. 2000); id.
at 261 (“After surgery, where follow-up care is needed, a surgeon must continue to
care for the patient until the threat of post-operative complications is past.”);
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to hospital machinery, he or she remains under the care of various
179
doctors and nurses, and a request for the withdrawal of lifesupporting treatment effectuates the patient’s right to terminate or
180
limit the scope of a treatment relationship.
When a patient
departs the hospital but remains hooked up to machinery, health
care professionals presumably remain responsible for supervising
181
use of the equipment.
When, however, a patient walks out the
door with a pacemaker, ICD, or LVAD, generally they are “good to
182
go,” subject, of course, to periodic return visits including eventual
James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, What Constitutes Physician-Patient Relationship
for Malpractice Purposes, 17 A.L.R. 4TH 132 (1982 & Supp. 2012).
179. Thus, one court offered the following explanation of the equivalence
between withholding and withdrawing a life-sustaining intervention:
Even though these life support devices are, to a degree, “self-propelled,”
each pulsation of the respirator or each drop of fluid introduced into the
patient’s body by intravenous feeding devices is comparable to a
manually administered injection or item of medication.
Hence
“disconnecting” of the mechanical devices is comparable to withholding
the manually administered injection or medication.
Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 490 (Ct. App. 1983) (ordering the
dismissal of murder charges against physicians who removed life-sustaining
treatments at the request of the patient’s family). Would it also be accurate to
regard each pulse from an implanted pacemaker (or jolt from an ICD) as akin to
letting physicians utilize external versions of these same devices on a hospitalized
patient?
180. See Gorsuch, supra note 141, at 653 (explaining that physicians who
comply with such requests “may intend only to discontinue treatment to permit
the patient to go home, to live without intrusive assistance”); id. at 706 (willing to
“leave ample room for patients to refuse the often hyper-technological
burdensome end-of-life care found in modern hospital environments”); Jed
Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 795 (1989) (envisioning
“the life of one confined to a hospital bed, attached to medical machinery, and
tended to by medical professionals[;] . . . the most elemental acts of existence—
such as breathing, digesting, and circulating blood—are forced upon him by an
external agency”).
181. See, e.g., McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 620 (Nev. 1990) (involving
quadriplegic using respirator at home); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 415 (N.J. 1987)
(involving an outpatient patient with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) who
“died shackled to the respirator” during the pendency of her appeal); id. at 408
(“Mrs. Farrell was paralyzed and confined to bed in need of around-the-clock
nursing care.”); id. at 414–15 (addressing the fact that she was at home). See
generally BRINGING THE HOSPITAL HOME: ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF HIGHTECH HOME CARE (John D. Arras ed., 1995).
182. See Simon, supra note 88, at 14 (“LVADs are implanted into patients and,
once implanted, can perform their functions independently of hospital-based
equipment or even medical intervention. They are meant for patients to live with
at home.”). Although they do not raise end-of-life issues, prosthetic limbs (and
joints) may provide another useful context for thinking about whether a
mechanical device has become an integral part of a person. See Ramachandran,
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183

replacement when the battery dies.
A request to deactivate an implanted cardiac-assist device may
require seeking out medical personnel and entering into a new
184
relationship for the sole purpose of discontinuing treatment.
Herein lies one of the practical problems that have arisen in these
situations, especially when patients are dying from some other
condition: upon entering hospice, they sometimes forget to
supra note 164, at 273–74 (“[I]n the case of a pacemaker or a robotic arm, humans
have merged with inorganic property . . . . [A]s these mergers between what we
have called ‘the body’ and ‘property’ become more common, sustaining different
formal legal statuses for the inorganic and the organic, for the ‘human’ and the
‘non-human,’ or for the internal and the external, may appear more and more
arbitrary.”); Rao, supra note 160, at 454 n.483 (“[A] pacemaker or an artificial limb
may be governed by the law of property only so long as it is separate from a living
human body. Once integrated with the body, however, such objects become part
of the person and should be afforded protection under the individual’s right of
privacy.”); Collin R. Bockman, Note, Cybernetic-Enhancement Technology and the
Future of Disability Law, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1323–31 (2010); id. at 1317 (“In the
near future, advances in neuroscience and robotics will change the way our society
views the human body by further reinforcing the concept of the body as a machine
with interchangeable, replaceable, and upgradeable parts.”); Brian Vastag,
Paralyzed Woman Moves Robotic Arm with Her Mind, WASH. POST, May 17, 2012, at A1.
183. See Wilkoff et al., supra note 8, at 911–13 (HRS consensus statement
offering guidelines for the nature and frequency of follow-up monitoring of
patients with different CIEDs); id. at 922 (emphasizing the importance of regular
monitoring after implantation); see also Mark H. Schoenfeld, Editorial, Deciding
Against Defibrillator Replacement: Second-Guessing the Past?, 23 PACING & CLINICAL
ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 2019, 2020 (2000) (“[T]he most common reason for
generator replacement, namely battery depletion, can be simply addressed with an
outpatient procedure.”).
184. See Nathan Goldstein et al., Management of Implantable CardioverterDefibrillators in Hospice: A Nationwide Survey, 152 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 296, 298
(2010) (“Hospices must create relationships with local electrophysiologists and
representatives from device manufacturing companies to ensure that patients—
especially those who cannot leave their place of residence—can have their [ICD]
devices reprogrammed [i.e., deactivated].”); Lewis et al., supra note 77, at 895
(noting that it has become “increasingly difficult for an electrophysiologist to
closely follow each patient, shifting follow-up to primary care physicians or
cardiologists,” adding that “device manufacturer representatives are frequently
relied on to perform device reprogramming”); Kolata, supra note 2, at A1
(reporting that, according to one expert, “medical care had become so
fragmented that doctors implanting the devices in patients still functioning well
could have a very different impression from doctors who care for people in the
end stages of heart disease”); see also Strachan et al., supra note 33, at 10 (“It has
been suggested that the onus for considering ICDs in relation to [end-of-life]
planning and issues surrounding resuscitation must also be shared by those
involved in implanting the devices.”); Wilkoff et al., supra note 8, at 916
(recognizing the “important interdependent relationship between the referring or
primary care physician, the implanting center, the implanting physician and the
CIED follow-up clinic”).
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mention their CIED, or their oncologists may defer to the
185
In fact,
judgment of the patient’s (former) cardiologist.
electrophysiologists who order CIED deactivation typically would
have to utilize a separate device (i.e., the programmer) not sold to
the patient but retained by the hospital and often delegate the task
186
to employees of the device manufacturer.
2.

Invoking Informed Consent Doctrine

The doctrine of informed consent also may help to define the
point where one crosses the line. After all, the right to refuse lifesustaining medical care originates in principles of patient self187
determination. The right to seek withdrawal of such care closely
tracks the right to refuse it initially. The parallel seems closest

185. See Meier, supra note 2, at B1; Stein, Devices Can Interfere, supra note 2, at
A1; see also Amy S. Kelley et al., Management of Patients with ICDs at the End of Life
(EOL): A Qualitative Study, 25 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE MED. 440, 445 (2009)
(“[I]n the context of advancing medical technology, which may be inadequately
understood by patients and their primary care providers, subspecialists have an
increasingly important role in discussions surrounding care at EOL.”); Jane
MacIver & Heather J. Ross, Withdrawal of Ventricular Assist Device Support, 21 J.
PALLIATIVE CARE 151, 155 (2005) (“Turning the [LVAD] off requires knowledge of
how to silence alarms, cease pump operation, disconnect the equipment, and turn
the power unit off. . . . The physicians in the ICU felt that, since the transplant
team had implanted the pump, the implanting surgeon should accept
responsibility for withdrawing support.”); Mueller, supra note 51, at 1543 (“[O]ne
would expect that fewer generalists have participated in and carried out CIED
deactivations than electrophysiologists and others who manage patients with
CIEDs. In addition, carrying out CIED deactivations requires technical expertise
and programming equipment that generalists do not have.”).
186. See Mueller et al., supra note 35, at 254 (“Evidence suggests that most
CIEDs are deactivated by [industry employees], not by physicians or nurses.”); id.
at 257, 260 (confirming this impression). In the case of pacemakers, however,
several companies do not allow their personnel to perform the deactivation. See
id. at 258; id. at 260 (“Even so, these [employees] reported participating in
pacemaker deactivations by entering settings for deactivation into the CIED
reprogramming instrument and having clinicians ‘push the button’ to execute the
deactivation commands.”).
187. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990) (“The
logical corollary of the doctrine of informed consent is that the patient generally
possesses the right not to consent, that is, to refuse treatment.”); Meisel, supra note
140, at 845–49; id. at 821 (“Consent is the mechanism for implementing the
fundamental principle of self-determination on which the entire edifice of the law
of medical decision-making at the end of life . . . is built.”); Danuta Mendelson,
Historical Evolution and Modern Implications of Concepts of Consent to, and Refusal of,
Medical Treatment in the Law of Trespass, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 6, 36–41 (1996). For
more on this doctrine, see Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy
Between Standard and Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 363–70 (2002).
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when the patient did not consent initially—perhaps because the
physician had acted in an emergency—and belatedly rejects the
188
intervention.
Alternatively, intermittent courses of treatment
(e.g., dialysis) would offer recurring opportunities for a patient to
189
Courts
withdraw simply by refusing to undergo another round.
and commentators generally have rejected suggestions that any
meaningful distinction exists between initially withholding and
190
later withdrawing life-sustaining treatment.
Nonetheless, many
191
clinicians remain uncomfortable with this equivalence.
A patient may, of course, revoke a previously granted
permission, even once a procedure has commenced, at least up
192
until the point of no return.
After a procedure has concluded,
however, a patient wishing it undone would have to enter into a
188. See, e.g., Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 221, 224 (Ct. App.
1984) (holding that a patient, who suffered a collapsed lung during a routine
biopsy, later had the right to demand the withdrawal of ventilator); see also M.G.
Tweeddale, Grasping the Nettle—What to Do When Patients Withdraw Their Consent for
Treatment, 28 J. MED. ETHICS 236, 237 (2002) (explaining that some patients may
“wish to revoke the implied consent that was assumed when emergency treatment
was initiated”). Federal rules governing human subjects research also specify a
right to withdraw. See Noah, supra note 105, at 357 & n.122.
189. See, e.g., Stouffer v. Reid, 993 A.2d 104, 106 (Md. 2010); In re Spring, 405
N.E.2d 115, 118, 120 (Mass. 1980); see also Lewis M. Cohen et al., Practical
Considerations in Dialysis Withdrawal: “To Have That Option Is a Blessing,” 289 JAMA
2113, 2114 (2003) (equating withdrawal with “discontinuation” of treatment).
190. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1234 (N.J. 1985); Cantor & Thomas, supra
note 139, at 92 (“Courts have uniformly rejected such a distinction, preferring to
recognize a patient’s prerogative to forgo medical intervention (whether by
withholding or withdrawing care) based on interests in self-determination and
bodily integrity.”); see also Lipman, supra note 32, at 109 (“Often, deciding to
withdraw treatment after a therapeutic trial is less problematic than deciding to
withhold the treatment in the first place. It is then clearer that the treatment did
not result in clinical improvement and the risks of continuing treatment outweigh
the benefits.”); Orentlicher, supra note 140, at 856 n.104 (“[E]thicists have long
argued that withholding life-sustaining treatment is worse than treatment
withdrawal because treatment withdrawal at least comes after a trial of the therapy,
while withholding denies the chance for an unexpected recovery.”).
191. See Neil J. Farber et al., Physicians’ Decisions to Withhold and Withdraw LifeSustaining Treatment, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 560, 563 (2006); Whitlock et al.,
supra note 84, at 1186 (noting “the discomfort some clinicians and family
members may feel when withdrawing, rather than withholding life-sustaining
therapies”).
192. See Schreiber v. Physicians Ins. Co., 588 N.W.2d 26, 31–33 (Wis. 1999)
(holding, in an obstetrics case, that a patient may withdraw consent in the middle
of a procedure, which then would require a new round of disclosure); id. at 31
(“We reject the notion that the onset of a procedure categorically forecloses a
patient’s withdrawal of consent. To be sure, at some point in virtually every
medical procedure a patient reaches a point from which there is no return.”).
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new relationship, and, even if the patient is eager to permit it, a
193
For instance, a patient
physician has no obligation to comply.
frightened by news of problems with an implanted device may
194
demand its explantation, but a surgeon (even if he or she
handled the original implantation) may refuse to participate if such
195
a procedure lacks medical justification.
One would think this even more obvious in the case of lifesaving devices implanted into a patient. For the sake of argument,

193. See Simon, supra note 88, at 15 (“Becoming involved in ending an
independent patient’s life [by deactivating an LVAD]—even one whose life is
being prolonged by our previous actions (to which he consented)—would be
impermissible. Medicine has no role in such cases.”); Wu, supra note 3, at 532
(“By consenting to having an implantable device placed, . . . the patient forfeits
the right to request removal of the device without due cause. A doctor should not
entertain requests for removal of a pacemaker which is functioning perfectly, just
because the patient changes his mind after informed consent.”).
194. See Katie Thomas, Unpredictable Danger Looms Close to the Heart, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 8, 2012, at A1 (reporting that, even though the FDA recently “recommended
that all patients with the [St. Jude] Riata undergo imaging to see if their [ICD]
lead was failing” but “advised against removing the leads pre-emptively,” a number
of patients have opted to undergo the risky explantation procedure
prophylactically). If a medical device manufacturer recalls an implant, courts
generally have allowed recipients to recover the costs associated with explant
surgery and accompanying emotional distress. See, e.g., Larsen v. Pacesetter Sys.,
Inc., 837 P.2d 1273, 1285–87 (Haw. 1992). If, however, explant surgery is not
medically indicated but undertaken at the patient’s insistence, courts have
rejected such claims. See, e.g., O’Brien v. Medtronic, Inc., 439 N.W.2d 151, 152–54
(Wis. Ct. App. 1989). Where defects may require explantation in limited
circumstances, plaintiffs instead may request “medical monitoring” costs. See, e.g.,
In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 172 F.R.D. 271, 276–78, 284–87 (S.D. Ohio
1997), rev’d on other grounds, 221 F.3d 870 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Dillon v.
Evanston Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357, 366–70 (Ill. 2002) (allowing a claim for increased
risk of future injuries where a catheter fragment became embedded in the wall of
a patient’s heart and she had abided by medical advice against attempted
removal).
195. See Thomas L. Hafemeister & Richard M. Gulbrandsen, Jr., The Fiduciary
Obligation of Physicians to “Just Say No” if an “Informed” Patient Demands Services That
Are Not Medically Indicated, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 335, 373–74 (2009); see also
Mitesh S. Amin et al., Management of Recalled Pacemakers and Implantable CardioverterDefibrillators: A Decision Analysis Model, 296 JAMA 412, 419 (2006); Paul A. Gould &
Andrew D. Krahn, Complications Associated with Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillator
Replacement in Response to Device Advisories, 295 JAMA 1907, 1910 (2006) (“ICD
generator replacement is not a benign procedure and carries a substantial risk of
complications, which include death.”); David Brown, Implantable Defibrillators Can
Be Erratic, Studies Find, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2006, at A8 (“[P]eople who learn that
the device implanted in their chest may have a defect should think hard before
having it replaced. Switching it out may be more risky than leaving it in.”); Barry
Meier, A Life or Death Decision, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2009, at B1 (describing some of
the difficulties involved in removing defective ICD leads).
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take wireless programmers out of the picture, so that the only way
to deactivate a cardiac-assist device would require explantation. If a
physician agreed to remove such a device at the patient’s request,
then death could result directly from a procedure that did not
promise any therapeutic benefit. The HRS consensus statement
included the following concession:
Patients might request removal of generator and/or leads
rather than reprogramming. Since the same effect can be
obtained by reprogramming and as surgical intervention
carries with it significant chance of introduction of a new
life-threatening pathology (e.g., infection, and/or
mechanical complications of lead extraction), surgical
intervention is not recommended. Legally, patients have
a right to refuse any treatment, but do not have the right
196
to demand mistreatment.
But, again, what if we assume away the ability to deactivate
wirelessly—does the patient’s right to withdraw consent then mean
197
an ability to insist on explantation surgery? Although the ease of
198
noninvasive deactivation offered an easy out in this context, the
196. Lampert et al., supra note 99, at 1012 (“A physician may judge the
removal reasonable under the particular circumstances and do so with informed
consent, but there is no ethical or legal obligation to meet this request.”).
Occasionally, explantation may have medical justification. See Michael Geist et al.,
Permanent Explantation of Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators, 23 PACING & CLINICAL
ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 2024, 2026, 2028 (2000).
197. Cf. Bramstedt & Wenger, supra note 93, at 545 (“Some devices, such as
ventriculoperitoneal shunts, lack on/off settings and, after they have served their
intended purpose and are no longer clinically needed, they are nonetheless not
explanted due to surgical risks.”); Jansen, supra note 59, at 107 (“Not
unreasonably, clinicians would balk at actively dismantling a patient’s mechanical
heart valve as a means to hastening his death. At least in most cases, such an
intervention would plausibly be described as a killing rather than as a withdrawal
of aid.”); Lampert et al., supra note 99, at 1012 (“Most would regard carrying out a
request to deactivate a pacemaker in a terminally-ill patient as far less morally
problematic than carrying out a request to remove an implanted porcine heart
valve in the same patient. Deactivating a pacemaker is non-invasive and does not
introduce a new pathology.”); Veatch, supra note 87, at 308 (imagining a scenario
where removal would pose little separate risk: a lung cancer patient undergoing
exploratory chest surgery); Wu, supra note 3, at 532 (“In devices that do not have
an off button or require sustaining [e.g., drug] therapy, neither the doctor nor the
patient has the right to remove it for futility or autonomy reasons, just as the
practice has been for renal transplants for the past few decades.”).
198. See, e.g., Spike, supra note 84, at 26 (“[A] pacemaker is [more] like a
portable ventilator [than an implanted heart valve], in that it is a life-sustaining
mechanical device whose source of control is external to the patient’s body.”).
Ventricular assist devices may, however, pose additional complexities if not also
explanted. See supra note 93 (discussing consequences of LVAD deactivation
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doctrine of informed consent can at best only partially explain a
patient’s right to demand withdrawal of an implanted life199
sustaining treatment.
Moreover, the prior decision to allow implantation of a
cardiac-assist device seems to represent the polar opposite of an
advance directive declining resuscitation—for instance, elderly
patients might want an ICD as insurance against the fear that, in
the event of a cardiac arrhythmia, health care professionals
otherwise might not undertake resuscitation on grounds of
200
futility
(or, in the event of later incapacity, a surrogate
without explantation); see also Bramstedt & Wenger, supra note 93, at 546 (“In
some ways, deactivating an LVAD is similar to turning off a ventilator, while
leaving the endotracheal tube in place. This action would make spontaneous
respiration even more difficult for the patient due to the increased dead space of
the tube.”). Nonetheless, these commentators defended the ethical propriety of
deactivation: “[A]lthough an implanted and yet unpowered LVAD may pose some
clinical harm to the patient, it is not equivalent to active killing of the patient, as
would be evident, for example, by infusion of a massive dose of potassium
chloride.” Id. at 547. (“The distinction between removing the LVAD and other
life-sustaining treatment is subtle but significant, and yet both are quite different
than the active promotion of death by external intervention.”).
199. Consider this foundational premise in the HRS consensus statement: “If a
clinician initiates or continues a treatment that a patient (or his/her surrogate)
has refused, then ethically and legally the clinician is committing battery,
regardless of the clinician’s intent.” Lampert et al., supra note 99, at 1010. In what
sense does an electrophysiologist unlawfully “continue” treatment with a
previously implanted CIED after a patient experiences a change of heart (pun
intended)?! Cf. Sulmasy, supra note 56, at 69 (“Patients and cardiologists alike
seem to view implanting an ICD as a ‘bridge’ that one crosses with no possibility of
return.”); Veatch, supra note 87, at 307 (“We do not have a well-developed analysis
of whether physicians faced with a refusal of continuing consent for the use of
these implanted technologies must remove them—as they would a trach tube or
ventilator—or must merely cease supporting their function. If they must merely
back off from support, the[se] . . . would, of course, continue to function for some
time.”).
200. See Richard A. Knox, Study Finds ICU Doctors Withholding Treatment, BOS.
GLOBE, Feb. 18, 1995, at A1 (reporting that “doctors often act unilaterally to
terminate life-sustaining treatment”); see also supra note 170. In one interesting
article, a couple of physicians explained what they saw as the benefits of ICD
deactivation at the end of life: “[I]n cases of terminal illness a sudden arrhythmic
cardiac death may be desirable to potentially reduce the period of suffering.”
Richard Kobza & Paul Erne, End-of-Life Decisions in ICD Patients with Malignant
Tumors, 30 PACING & CLINICAL ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 845, 845 (2007). Their survey
of a small group of fully informed ICD patients with advanced cancer surprised
them. See id. at 848 (“[A]lthough all six patients had previously suffered from an
appropriate or inappropriate ICD shock, none approved deactivation of their
ICD.”); id. (“[W]e [mistakenly] expected that some of our patients with an ICD
and terminal cancer would have wished for a deactivation of their ICD.”); see also
Anders Ågård et al., Views of Patients with Heart Failure About Their Role in the Decision
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201

decisionmaker declines it ). No doubt recipients may come to
regret such choices, based perhaps on their experience with the
202
devices (or, as discussed herein, the development of an unrelated
203
terminal illness not contemplated at the time of implantation ),
but the informed consent doctrine fails to establish any subsequent
right to insist on removal (or, by extension, the far less complicated
204
step of wireless deactivation).
to Start Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillator Treatment: Prescription Rather Than
Participation, 33 J. MED. ETHICS 514, 517 (2007) (finding that some recipients view
ICDs as “life insurance”); Garrick C. Stewart et al., Patient Expectations from
Implantable Defibrillators to Prevent Death in Heart Failure, 16 J. CARDIAC FAILURE 106,
110 (2010) (“[M]ost [ICD patients surveyed] indicated that they would not
consider inactivating defibrillation even in the presence of end-stage heart failure
or other disease.”).
201. See Paola & Walker, supra note 172, at 20–21 (offering such an illustration,
but making no mention of the original implantation decision as a relevant factor
when the surrogate later consents to a DNR order). This could become important
if a proxy requests CIED deactivation for an incompetent patient. Although
individuals can always change their minds, and modify or rescind an advance
directive, the implanted device, especially an ICD implanted in a situation where
the patient has not (yet) experienced an arrhythmia, see Pasquale Santangeli et al.,
Meta-Analysis: Age and Effectiveness of Prophylactic Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillators,
153 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 592, 597–98 (2010), seems to speak loudly about the
recipient’s preferences, see Rady & Verheijde, supra note 95, at 1087 (noting that,
“if the device is deactivated without the onset of [an unrelated] life-threatening
illness, then the mode of death is what patients have objected to when consenting
to device implantation”); see also John A. Robertson, Precommitment Issues in
Bioethics, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1849, 1854 (2003) (“[I]t strikes me as helpful to view the
use of implantable defibrillators as a type of precommitment.”). Perhaps that
means a default rule of deactivating CIEDs only at the insistence of patients at the
end-of-life or by explicit mention in an advance directive.
202. See Arash Arya et al., Prevalence and Predictors of Electrical Storm in Patients
with Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillator, 97 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 389 (2006); Margret
Leosdottir et al., Health-Related Quality of Life of Patients with Implantable Cardioverter
Defibrillators Compared with That of Pacemaker Recipients, 8 EUROPACE 168 (2006);
Huagui Li et al., Causes and Consequences of Discontinuation of the Implantable
Cardioverter-Defibrillator Therapy in Non-Terminally Ill Patients, 81 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY
1203, 1204 (1998).
203. See Jeffrey T. Berger et al., Advance Health Planning and Treatment
Preferences Among Recipients of Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators: An Exploratory
Study, 17 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 72, 74, 76 (2006) (finding some “evolution of
preferences” in this regard); Goldstein et al., supra note 33, at 11 (predicting the
same); see also Stacey Burling, Mechanical-Heart Patient Comes to Regret His Life-Saving
Choice, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 14, 2002, at A1; cf. Strachan et al., supra note 33, at 7
(“Interestingly, when asked to anticipate their preferences should they become
terminally ill, the majority of patients with heart failure who received an ICD for
primary prevention said they would not deactivate it, even if they were receiving
daily shocks.”).
204. Separately, some commentators fear that denying a right of later
withdrawal will make physicians and patients more apt to refuse potentially
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Navigating Imprecise Legislative Boundaries

The characterization problem does not arise solely in
constitutional and common-law litigation.
Indeed, because
ultimately the question boils down to whether physicians might risk
prosecution, one must pay attention to ambiguities and variations
among different state statutes as they might apply to the
205
deactivation of implanted cardiac-assist devices.
Most states have
laws that allow individuals to execute advance directives to decline
life-sustaining treatments and exempt physician involvement in
206
such cases from prohibitions on assisting suicide. A few state laws
go further and authorize physician-assisted suicide, though only in
207
limited circumstances, while leaving withdrawal requests largely

beneficial interventions from the outset. See Cantor, supra note 44, at 1804–05 &
n.65; Philip G. Peters, Jr. et al., Physician Willingness to Withhold Tube Feeding After
Cruzan: An Empirical Study, 57 MO. L. REV. 831, 834–35 & n.17, 838–40 (1992).
Whether or not this suffices to make the two types of choices equivalent, the
available research on patient views of cardiac-assist devices suggests that it is highly
unlikely to occur in this setting. As for physicians, perhaps they should think more
carefully before implanting such devices in very elderly or frail patients. Lastly, of
course, this concern presumably would not suffice to allow “deactivation” of
transplanted hearts or other critical organs.
205. See Katherine Ann Wingfield & Carl S. Hacker, Physician-Assisted Suicide:
An Assessment and Comparison of Statutory Approaches Among the States, 32 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 13, 64 (2007) (finding a “wide degree of variation among the states with
respect to physician-assisted suicide”).
206. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 796–97 & n.2, 805 n.9 (1997); Meisel,
supra note 140, at 822 (“Passively hastening death includes refusal of treatment,
termination of life support, forgoing treatment, or withholding and withdrawing
treatment, and variants on these terms.”); Marni J. Lerner, Note, State Natural
Death Acts: Illusory Protection of Individuals’ Life-Sustaining Treatment Decisions, 29
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 175, 184–85 & n.45, 187–208, 212–21 (1992). Several states also
create a limited safe harbor for “terminal sedation.” See Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 780 & n.15 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring); see also George P. Smith,
II, Terminal Sedation as Palliative Care: Revalidating a Right to a Good Death, 7
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 382, 382 (1998). At least one state’s statute
provides a non-exhaustive list of covered treatments. See Illinois Living Will Act,
755 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 35/2(d) (2012). Legislators also have amended these
statutes to address ambiguities about whether they reach artificial nutrition and
hydration. See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 149, § 7.07[B].
207. See Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800–.897
(2012); Washington Death with Dignity Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245 (2012);
Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1222 (Mont. 2009); see also Katie Hafner, In Ill
Doctor, a Surprise Reflection of Who Picks Assisted Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2012, at
A1 (noting limited use of the two statutes); Kim Severson, Georgia Court Rejects Law
Aimed at Assisted Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2012, at A19 (reporting that Vermont
and Massachusetts are considering legislation to authorize physician-assisted
suicide, while 37 states criminalize it).
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208

unencumbered by any restrictions.
Conversely, rather than rely
on existing and generally applicable prohibitions on assisting
suicide, a couple of states have enacted legislation specifically
209
designed to ban physician aid in dying.
Putting aside the
relatively low likelihood of detection or prosecution, consensus
statements from professional groups approving an end-of-life
practice such as CIED deactivation provide no meaningful
210
assurance against legal jeopardy in such cases.
D.

“Kill” Switches to the Rescue?

Congress did not impose licensure requirements for medical
devices until 1976, a move prompted in part by widely publicized
211
Over the last decade, the Food and Drug
pacemaker recalls.
Administration (FDA) has confronted tricky regulatory difficulties
with CIEDs, but these have revolved around the threat of
212
malfunctions involving life-sustaining products,
especially
208. Cf. Susan M. Wolf, Holding the Line on Euthanasia, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Jan.–Feb. 1989 (Special Supp.), at 13 (warning that recognition of a right to
physician assistance might encroach on the heretofore broad right to decline or
withdraw). In other words, even in places like Oregon, patients seeking physician
assistance in deactivating cardiac-assist devices would prefer that it get
characterized as a request for the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment rather
than PAS.
209. See Wingfield & Hacker, supra note 205, at 49–50 (Arkansas and Rhode
Island). Perhaps feeling hemmed in by three of its neighboring states that allow
the practice, Idaho passed such a law in 2011. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4017(3)–
(6) (2012); see also id. § 18-4017(5)(b) (exempting a “health care professional who
withholds or withdraws treatment or procedures” upon request from the patient
or a proxy).
210. Cf. Lampert et al., supra note 99, at 1023 (“[T]here are European
countries where deactivation of antibradycardia pacing in pacemaker dependent
patient[s] is prohibited by law. It is therefore crucial that clinicians are aware of
the legal situation in the country and jurisdiction in which they are practicing.”).
211. See Susan Bartlett Foote, Loops and Loopholes: Hazardous Device Regulation
Under the 1976 Medical Device Amendments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 7
ECOLOGY L.Q. 101, 102 & n.4 (1978); see also Robin Miller, Annotation, Products
Liability: Cardiac Pacemakers, 23 A.L.R. 6TH 223 (2007 & Supp. 2012) (canvassing
some of the case law that has emerged from tort litigation over pacemakers and
ICDs).
212. See Kim A. Eagle, Editorial, Safety Alerts Involving Device Therapy for
Arrhythmias, 286 JAMA 843, 844 (2001); William H. Maisel et al., Pacemaker and ICD
Generator Malfunctions: Analysis of Food and Drug Administration Annual Reports, 295
JAMA 1901, 1904–05 (2006); Marc Kaufman, More Heart Devices Malfunction; As
Sophistication Has Grown, So Have Failures, FDA Reports, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2005,
at A7; see also Barry Meier, F.D.A. Seeks Better Data from Tests of Devices, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 30, 2009, at B1 (summarizing reviews that found problems with the quality of
information submitted to the agency in support of high-risk cardiovascular
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questions about when to order recalls or recommend
213
Now, instead of potential failures or other safety
explantation.
problems, the agency also might have to worry that the devices
work too well or last too long. Rarely, however, does “overefficacy”
214
counsel against product approval, and the FDA typically does not
215
consider ethical questions when reviewing licensing applications.
To the extent that health care professionals refuse to assist,
whether on ethical grounds or from fears of prosecution (well216
founded or not),
a few commentators have called on
devices).
213. See Edward M. Basile & Beverly H. Lorell, The Food and Drug
Administration’s Regulation of Risk Disclosure for Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators:
Has Technology Outpaced the Agency’s Regulatory Framework?, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
251, 261, 265–69 (2006).
214. See Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated
Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 654–59, 663, 664–65 (2003) (concluding
that the FDA should revisit previously granted licenses for ovulation-inducing
agents because of their tendency to result in dangerous multifetal pregnancies);
id. at 628 (“Normally, efficacy and safety operate independently of one
another . . . . In the case of fertility drugs, however, the primary risk inheres in
their very effectiveness.”).
215. See Dov Fox, Safety, Efficacy, and Authenticity: The Gap Between Ethics and Law
in FDA Decisionmaking, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1135, 1197 (focusing on
enhancement technologies, especially the approval of human growth hormone for
otherwise healthy children of short stature, and concluding that “the FDA’s onesize-fits-all system of approval is unsuited to evaluate the ethical concerns
accompanying the emerging class of medical products that act not to prevent
disease or restore health, but instead to reduce wrinkles or enlarge breasts or
sharpen memory”). The agency’s review of TAHs provided a stark illustration of
this gap. See David Brown, Artificial Heart Gets Limited FDA Approval: Device, Which
Can Provide Extra Months of Life, Meets Humanitarian Provision, WASH. POST, Sept. 6,
2006, at A8 (discussing the fully implanted AbioCor, which extended patients’ lives
by approximately four months at a cost of $350,000); Rob Stein, FDA Approves
Artificial Heart for Those Awaiting Transplant; Doctors Hail the $100,000 Device, but
Critics Question Whether Cost Is Justified, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2004, at A3 (reporting
that SynCardia’s update of the Jarvik-7 as a bridge to transplant represented a
milestone as “the first [FDA-approved device] to supplant most of the functions of
the heart or any other major organ,” but adding that “critics questioned the value
of the $100,000 device, saying it will only add expense to the nation’s already
bloated health care bill without increasing the number of heart patients who
survive” because it does nothing about the underlying shortage of organs available
for transplant).
216. See Farr A. Curlin et al., Religion, Conscience, and Controversial Clinical
Practices, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 593, 596 tbl.1 (2007) (finding, for instance, that
17% of surveyed physicians objected to terminal sedation); id. at 597 (adding that
“29% of patients—or nearly 100 million Americans—may be cared for by
physicians who do not believe they have an obligation to refer the patient to
another provider for such [controversial] treatments”); Lampert et al., supra note
99, at 1013 (recognizing that conscientious objectors could decline to deactivate
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manufacturers to supply recipients with clear directions or a simple
217
mechanism for disabling implanted cardiac-assist devices. Insofar
as physicians often fail to broach the subject at the time of
implantation, the FDA could require better patient labeling that
218
included such information.
Less plausibly, the agency could
demand the inclusion of patient-controlled remote deactivation
switches in the design of these devices, but, even if one could
overcome serious practical difficulties, any technological fix
empowering patients to act on their own undoubtedly would
trigger a variety of objections.
V. CONCLUSION
This hardly represents the first time that technological
219
advances have affected previously settled legal lines.
In the
CIEDs); Alan Meisel et al., Seven Legal Barriers to End-of-Life Care: Myths, Realities,
and Grains of Truth, 284 JAMA 2495, 2495–96 (2000).
217. See Deborah Grassman, Letter, EOL Considerations in Defibrillator
Deactivation, 22 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE MED. 179, 179 (2005) (wondering
whether ICD manufacturers should take responsibility for supplying printed
patient education materials and perhaps also magnets allowing for selfdeactivation); Raphael et al., supra note 33, at 1632 (“We looked at the possibility
of a variable switch-off mode for future device development. . . . Theoretically,
toward the end of life, the [ICD] could be programed so it was inactive while the
patient was asleep, allowing a peaceful death from natural causes if a lifethreatening arrhythmia were to occur during this time.”); cf. Lampert et al., supra
note 99, at 1021 (“suggest[ing] that clinicians consider providing a doughnut
magnet (along with specific instructions on its use) to [ICD] patients who are
diagnosed with a terminal illness”). Researchers gave the first recipient of an
artificial heart just such a mechanism. See James Rachels, Barney Clark’s Key,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1983, at 17.
218. Recently, the agency has mandated that physicians secure written
informed consent from patients—coupled with other restrictions on prescribing
and dispensing certain drugs—though in order to ensure against inappropriate
use that carries serious risks of injury. See Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to
Federalism in Controlling the Practice of Medicine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 149, 188–91
(2004) (discussing a variety of distribution restrictions on prescription drugs
considered by regulatory officials); Lars Noah, Too High a Price for Some Drugs?: The
FDA Burdens Reproductive Choice, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 231, 234–36 (2007) (focusing
on teratogens such as Accutane and Thalomid); see also Food and Drug
Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–85, § 901(b), 121 Stat.
823, 930 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355–1(f)(3)(A) (2012)) (granting the FDA
express authority to impose such restrictions).
219. See Michael H. Shapiro, Constitutional Adjudication and Standards of Review
Under Pressure from Biological Technologies, 11 HEALTH MATRIX 351, 385–86, 417–18,
422–27, 484–86 (2001); id. at 462 (“[A]lterations in the technological terrain have
pushed us beyond simple conceptualizations of life and death.”); id. at 468
(referring to “category straddling induced by technological changes”); see also id.
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context of abortion, for example, improvements in neonatology
220
have dramatically lowered the threshold of fetal viability, thereby
221
undermining the trimester framework suggested in Roe v. Wade.
Some critics might respond that CIEDs offer further evidence of
incoherence in the distinctions originally drawn by the Supreme
222
Court in the right-to-die cases, though proponents of those lines
likely would not relent, instead taking comfort in the views of most
medical ethicists that equate deactivation with the permissible
withdrawals of other forms of life-sustaining treatment. Perhaps
categorical judgments (one way or another) ultimately must
remain elusive—homogeneity does not exist among implanted
cardiac-assist devices, much less among the various patients who
might request their deactivation—so that one cannot escape paying
greater attention to nuance, especially the extent to which a patient
is device dependent (both in the sense that the implant has turned
a terminal illness into a successfully managed chronic condition,
and in the sense that withdrawal likely spells doom for the patient).
Implanted cardiac-assist devices pose serious challenges to the
well-accepted equivalence between refusing and requesting the
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatments. No doubt many judges
would find deactivation lawful because—perhaps taking a cue from
the near consensus among medical ethicists—it shares enough
superficial similarities with the withdrawal of other interventions.
at 442 (cautioning against “exaggerat[ing] the degree of conceptual innovation
that constitutional jurisprudence will have to bear as biomedical technology
develops”).
220. See Kathy L. Kyser et al., Improving Survival of Extremely Preterm Infants Born
Between 22 and 25 Weeks of Gestation, 119 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 795, 800
(2012); Noah, supra note 214, at 619–20 & nn.70–71; Christine Hauser, For the
Tiniest Babies, the Closest Thing to a Cocoon, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2007, at F1
(reporting that the record for viability had dropped below 22 weeks of gestation).
221. 410 U.S. 113, 163–65 (1973); see also id. at 160 (conceding that viability
may occur earlier); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860, 870
(1992) (recognizing this development); id. at 872–73 (rejecting as unduly “rigid”
the trimester framework); Nancy K. Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Revamping
Roe v. Wade, 95 YALE L.J. 639, 641, 655–62 (1986) (same); Jessica H. Schultz, Note,
Development of Ectogenesis: How Will Artificial Wombs Affect the Legal Status of a Fetus or
Embryo?, 84 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 877, 886–88 (2010) (anticipating the consequences
of possible future advances); cf. John Leland, Abortion Might Outgrow Its Need for
Roe v. Wade, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2005, § 4, at 14 (explaining that, “while
combatants focus on the law, technology is already changing the future of
abortion,” particularly with the off-label use of misoprostol to induce a
miscarriage).
222. Cf. Orentlicher, supra note 146, at 963–64 (making such a point about the
Court’s willingness to countenance terminal sedation).
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Even if patients should enjoy the freedom to cease using implanted
223
cardiac-assist devices, I have little use for such charades.
Deactivation represents a distinctive form of physician aid in dying,
one that we should allow candidly rather than by pretending that it
fits comfortably within the existing category of permissible
224
withdrawals of life-sustaining treatment.
Thus, states should
consider amending their statutes to clearly authorize physician
225
subject to
deactivation of some or all cardiac-assist devices,
whatever collateral restrictions seem appropriate. In addition to
confirming the legality of deactivation, revisions to these advance
directive statutes should prompt specific questions about patients’
wishes about the continued use of their implanted cardiac-assist
devices.
223. See Cantor, supra note 44, at 1841 (objecting to “the hypocrisy of
pretending that contemporary American society truly bars PAD [physician-assisted
death]”); cf. Lars Noah, A Postmodernist Take on the Human Embryo Research Debate,
36 CONN. L. REV. 1133, 1152–61 (2004) (lambasting an effort to sidestep
controversy over research using embryonic stem cells simply by redefining certain
terms); Lars Noah, Civil Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1601, 1638–52 (2001)
(decrying judicial tolerance of jurors’ tendencies to disregard their instructions in
tort litigation); Lars Noah, Pigeonholing Illness: Medical Diagnosis as a Legal Construct,
50 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 296–306 (1999) (criticizing physician dishonesty).
224. Twenty years ago, one prominent bioethicist drew the following
conclusion pertinent to this set of problems:
There is no denying that a substantial moral and legal consensus exists
about how to handle most cases involving forgoing of life-sustaining
treatment. The core elements seem firmly established. Yet as we apply
that consensus to more and more cases we discover novel situations to
which the consensus cannot be applied directly. Unlike the controversy
over active mercy killing, it is not necessarily that there is enormous
moral or legal disagreement about these cases. Rather we are discovering
new twists on the old problems for which our old principles . . . do not
provide clear conclusions. We are ready for a new generation of moral
debates in the ethics of terminal care from which newer, more subtle
guidelines will have to emerge.
Robert M. Veatch, Forgoing Life-Sustaining Treatment: Limits to the Consensus, 3
KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 1, 17–18 (1993).
225. See Paola et al., supra note 148, at 37 (concluding that a DNR order would
allow for ICD deactivation, but adding that “clarification via an amendment to the
[applicable New York] statute or the regulations would be welcome”); cf. Timothy
E. Quill et al., Palliative Options of Last Resort: A Comparison of Voluntarily Stopping
Eating and Drinking, Terminal Sedation, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Voluntary Active
Euthanasia, 278 JAMA 2099, 2104 (1997) (“Explicit public policies about which of
these 4 practices are permissible and under what circumstances could have
important benefits.”). But cf. Brody, supra note 137, at 962 n.68 (“[T]here is
relatively little established law, either statutory or case law, regarding these ‘fencesitting’ cases. . . . Many physicians probably prefer that the law remain silent on
these cases and that they be handled in the future by medical discretion . . . .”).
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